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ABSTRACT
Nuclear escalation control theory rests on the idea that decision makers, in a limited
nuclear war scenario, will choose their actions based on a rational assessment of the
available information. That information essentially consists of intelligence reports about
one’s adversary and information reporting the status of one’s own forces’ ability to
execute offensive actions and the damage level of vital national targets. Yet the practical
limits of managing the flow and quality of this information, coupled with the fog and
friction inherent in human analyses, significantly affect the decision-making process visà-vis nuclear escalation. Hence, these limitations cast a pall over any military doctrine
that relies heavily on the assumption that nuclear escalation can be controlled with
precision. Examining information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis shows
the practical limits of managing this information flow, which in turn limits the ability of
national leaders to make such decisions properly.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapon and, in doing so,
shattered the US nuclear monopoly, nuclear theorists have tried to reconcile existing
international relations theory with a world that possesses weapons of unprecedented
power. The power of nuclear weapons, in turn, gave rise to the short-lived doctrine of
"massive retaliation." This controversial theory, embraced by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, posited that the threat of a devastating nuclear attack could deter any
military provocation because the sheer destructive potential of such an attack would give
pause to any potential adversary.
Massive retaliation, however, quickly found itself challenged by national security
theorists. Senior US Army officials in particular took issue with the idea that strategic
nuclear weapons would so threaten the survival of an adversary that it would refrain from
offensive actions. Recognizing that there is likely a range of potential conflicts between
total nuclear war and peace, thinkers pushed for a new conception of military strategy
that relied on numerous options built around so-called “limited war.”1

Limited War
The concept of limited war evolved over the course of several decades. As
theorists in the 1960s defined it, individual belligerents exchanged nuclear attacks against
targets of tactical, operational, and strategic value. These attacks used “strategic or longrange weapons,” in such a way that is “deliberately and voluntarily limited in the total

1

Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960. p. 27.
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amount of damage threatened, planned, and done as well as in the kinds of targets
attacked.”2 Such conflicts, in theory, focus on much simpler objectives of much-reduced
stakes.
By the conclusion of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, exactly how
limited those nuclear options proved to be in practice was open to debate. The US
military received its policy guidance from the National Strategic Targeting and Attack
Policy (NSTAP), which identified three core missions for the US strategic forces in the
event of conflict. The first core task was to destroy both the political leadership and the
strategic forces located outside of urban areas of both the Soviet Union and China. The
second task was to destroy the non-urban conventional military capabilities of the Soviet
Union and China. The third and final task was to destroy those strategic capabilities of
the Soviet Union and China located within urban areas3.
These tasks, then, were integrated into the Single Integrated Operations Plan
(SIOP) as “five attack options against the Soviet Union and other communist countries”
which included some variations of each targeting task, some of which were pre-emptive
and some of which were retaliatory4. In addition to these five options, US decision
makers would be given the ability to exclude, or “withhold” some targets from
consideration, including exempting certain major targets (such as national capitals), as
well as individual countries (as an example, the United States could exclude

2

Read, Thornton, and Klaus Knorr. Limited Strategic War. New York: Published for the Center
of International Studies, Princeton University, by Praeger, 1962. p 3.
3
Kaplan, Fred M. The wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.
pp. 267-268
4
Burr, William. The Nixon Administration, the SIOP, and the Search for Limited Nuclear
Options, 1969-1974. November 23, 2005. Accessed April 17, 2017.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/.
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Czechoslovakia)5. In doing so, then, decision makers would be granted limited options to
engage in nuclear operations at a level below general war. In doing so, the hope was US
decision makers would be able to negotiate war termination at a level agreeable to US
interests.
At the beginning of the Nixon Administration, however, it was decided that these
options were insufficient. Aiming to further develop a “broad range of limited options
aimed at terminating war on terms acceptable to the U.S. at the lowest levels of conflict
feasible”6 the new policy sought to “control escalation by setting clear boundaries on the
scale of the attack.”7 As Kissinger would observe during the formulation of this strategy,
large inflexible options would portend massive destruction, and as such “smaller
packages will be used to avoid going to larger ones.”8
This doctrine, later known as the Schlesinger Doctrine9, sought to avoid
catastrophic damage during a nuclear confrontation by creating smaller and more discrete
targeting packages, so that a decision maker could engage some finite targets while
avoiding others, in the hope that the adversary would reciprocate. In this regard, then, the
emphasis on “limited war” shifted from one of whole-target sets to even smaller options,
such as “selected economic and military resources of the enemy critical to post-war

5

Ibid
US White House. Office of the National Security Advisor. Memorandum for the President
“Nuclear Policy.” Henry A. Kissinger. January 7, 1974. Office of the President, Washington,
D.C.
7
Ibid.
8
US National Security Council. “Notes on NSC Meeting 14 February 1969.” Washington, D.C.
9
Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to
Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. p. 466
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recovery” or “those enemy military forces which otherwise could exercise internal
control over…post-attack recovery.”10
A good example of how these kinds of options would proceed is Exercise ABLE
ARCHER, a notable Cold War exercise that rehearsed such a limited nuclear war in
1983. Exercise planners envisioned that death in the Soviet leadership led to political
turmoil within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia, during this chaos,
turned to the West for financial and military assistance to counteract its stagnating
economy. The Soviet Politburo, fearing that Yugoslavia's action might prompt other
Warsaw Pact nations to abandon the Soviet Union, launched an invasion of Yugoslavia,
hoping to quell dissent as it had in the Hungarian Revolution and Prague Spring.
This invasion, however, mobilized NATO. In response, the Soviet Union then
invaded Norway, Finland, and Greece. As NATO attempted to repel these attacks, the
bulk of the Soviet Forces in Germany attacked through the Fulda Gap. The fighting went
badly for NATO. After several days of battle, which included air strikes and Army
Special Forces infiltrations into Crimea, NATO employed a nuclear weapon against a
target within the Soviet Union. This employment was intended to signal that the NATO
was willing to escalate the conflict to terminate the conflict, hoping that such a signal
would persuade the Soviet Union to sue for peace in a manner favorable to NATO. This
nuclear weapon, targeted against Kiev, marked the conclusion of the exercise (and
presumably, in the minds of the designers, the limited war)11.

10 US Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy.” 10 April 1974. Washington, D.C.
11 Houghton, Vince, and Nate Jones. "Able Archer 83: An Interview with Nate Jones ·
SpyCast." Spycast. November 15, 2016. Accessed November 28, 2016.
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Such limited nuclear conflicts, while obviously more ideal than a general nuclear
war, are far more subjective and prone to overall misperception. Indeed, as the Cold War
continued, there was a recognition that limited war, while better than a general nuclear
war, was still not an ideal option. As nuclear theorist Paul Bracken observe in the 1980s:
Some may not like the theory of limited war, especially in its nuclear variety, and
there is no guarantee that the theory actually will work in practice. Nuclear war
once begun may escalate to nearly complete levels of national destruction. For
this reason, any principles and incentives that indicate a way for a nuclear war to
end short of these damage levels can be criticized. But having at least some basis
for believing war could end before massive casualties is better than not having
any basis for believing this.12
Escalation
A necessary part of limited war is the concept of “escalation”, or “an increase in
the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or
more of the participants…. Escalation can be unilateral, but it is often reciprocal, as each
combatant struggles ever harder to achieve victory or avoid defeat.”13 US Air Force styles
this doctrine as “escalation dominance,” namely “the ability to increase the adversaries’
cost of defiance while denying them the opportunity to neutralize those costs (e.g., the
threat of a major increase in the tempo of operations against them).”14 Such an ability

https://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/able-archer-83-an-interview-with-natejones/.
12 Carter, Ashton B., John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket. Managing Nuclear
Operations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. p 199.
13 Morgan, Forrest E. Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2008.
14 US Department of the Air Force. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development.
Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum.
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requires an understanding of both the “total resolve” and “relative resolve” of the
participants of a crisis. A state’s total resolve consists of three key components:
● Stakes: “Strategic objectives or national interests.”
● Credible Capabilities: “The relevant factors of time, space, and forces...that
enhance the perception that escalation is possible.”
● Risk Tolerance: “Inherent aggressiveness or boldness."
Relative resolve is “how one actor perceives the other actor’s resolve relative to its own,
and is calculated as the difference between the challenger’s resolve and the defender’s
resolve.”15 However, for a decision maker to assess relative resolve requires an
understanding of each participant's total resolve. Without such an understanding, a
decision maker may misread the overall situation and select actions that may worsen a
crisis.
Such an understanding is often elusive, leading to imperfect decision making. As
will be argued hereafter, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, provides a useful
rubric for understanding the sources of such imperfections.

National Decision-Making
Escalation requires action on the part of a crisis participant. As such, it is helpful
to have a methodological framework to understand leadership decision making. Though
many models exist, perhaps the most useful for this task is the Observe-Orient-DecideAct (OODA) Loop.
Fighter pilot and military theorist John Boyd created the OODA Loop, which has
given the loop the alternate name of "The Boyd Loop." This concept was fleshed out in
Creation and Destruction, an unpublished paper, as well as in “Discourses on Winning
15 Ducharme, Douglas R. "Measuring Strategic Deterrence: A Wargaming Approach." Joint
Forces Quarterly, July 2016, pp. 40-46.
6

and Losing,” and “Patterns of Conflict,” briefings Boyd created and gave to explain the
theory to government decision makers. Boyd posits that conflict is a “time-competitive
cycle” in which both sides attempt to impose their will on their adversary by responding
to their decision making the fastest.16
Imagine a boxer during a prize fight. In the “Observe” phase, the fighter is
amassing as much information about his adversary as possible as well as about the ring
itself. He might observe what direction his opponent is approaching from, if he is
favoring one side of his body over the other, where he has his footing, if there is a puddle
of water in the middle of the ring, etc.
In the second phase, “Orient,” the boxer pairs his observation of his adversary
with an understanding of that opponent's background: What is that adversary's fighting
style? What kind of advice is his coach likely giving him? Is he prone to rash actions if
pressured? Does he favor a particular kind of punch? This phase is the most critical and
most difficult of all those in the OODA loop.17 “Orient” cannot be achieved through
simple modeling or organizational changes; it requires an individual decision maker to
not only acquire a thorough understanding of the adversary but to reach that
understanding at an almost unconscious level. Boyd himself recognized that a potentially
vast array of factors must be understood to “actually understand” an opponent, including
such concepts as “cultural traditions”, “previous experiences”, and “genetic heritage”. 18
The third phase is “Decide”, namely, to settle upon an action to engage the
adversary. Taking the information he has gathered about his opponent and the
16 Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. p. 5.
17 Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Boston: Little,
Brown, 2002. pp. 334-335.
18 Coram, p. 335.
7

environment from the “Observe” phase, and then pairing that with a holistic
understanding of that adversary in the “Decide” phase, the boxer decides what kind of
punch to use. Perhaps a right hook would be the best punch to deliver to his opponent
because that opponent is favoring one side of his body due to blows sustained earlier in
the fight. Or, the boxer might rely on the knowledge that the gym where the opponent
trains does a poor job of teaching its boxers on how to defend against such a strike.
The final phase is “Act”, is where a decision maker carries out the action decided
upon in the previous phase. In the context of the ongoing boxing example, the boxer then
delivers a right hook to his adversary. Once complete, the cycle begins again, with the
boxer observing how his opponent responded to the strike and planning his next move
accordingly. The goal of the OODA loop is to run through this cycle as quickly and
efficiently as possible (and, in any case, more efficiently than one's adversary). Doing so
allows a decision-maker to better manage the chaos and uncertainty implicit within
conflict and cause the adversary’s ability to resist to collapse—in effect “out-OODA-ing”
the adversary.19
Military historians who are critical of Boyd’s theory, such as Daniel Bolger, argue
that the theory is overly abstract and idealized.20 Others, like Robert R. Leonard, argue
that Boyd’s theory is difficult to apply in practice given modern organizational and
societal constraints.21 Despite these critiques, as a framework for understanding human
decision making during a conflict, the OODA-Loop should not be summarily dismissed;

19 Polk, Robert B. "A Critique of the Boyd Theory: Is It Applicable to the Army." M.A. thesis,
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999.
20 Daniel P. Bolger, "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered," in Maneuver Warfare Anthology ed.
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 21-22.
21 Polk, p 36.
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for, although properly moving through the Loop in real time might be difficult to train for
and accomplish in practice, it can be useful in understanding past decision making or
hypothetical decision making in the future.
Information management has a significant role to play within the Boyd Loop,
both for the “observe” and “orient” phases. For decision makers to make decisions, they
require the information needed to make those decisions accurately. That information
must be collected, selected for relevance, properly analyzed, and transmitted to proper
decision makers. Yet as military theorists have observed for centuries, this process of
information management is not perfect. Information that is incorrect, misunderstood, or
simply absent is a constant fixture of warfare. Writing in 1832, in the wake of the
Napoleonic Wars, Carl von Clausewitz observed that:
If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the
region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three
quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of
greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called
for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.22

This “fog” is where the “fog of war” concept has its roots. The fog of war posits
that “[w]ar is inherently volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.”23 In doing so, it
asserts that commanders are not omniscient. As one analyst attempting to capture the
essence of the problem remarked:
“Whether he is a rookie fighter pilot, a silver-haired fleet admiral, or an aging
politician, the commander of a military force wants to know more than [he or she]
22 Von Clausewitz, Carl, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret. On war. Norwalk, CT: Easton Press,
1991. p. 101
23 Kiesling, Eugina C. ""On War: Without the Fog"." Military Review, Sept. & Oct. 2001, 8587.
9

usually gets told about the enemy. Commanders in the field, whether of an army
or an airplane, generally also want to know more about the environment weather, for example, or the relevant terrain. Finally, much as it pains a
bureaucracy like an armed service to admit it, a commander often lacks the ability
to get [his or her] own organization to report adequately about its own status to
carry out [his or her] orders. Even in an Army of smokeless powder and ball
bearings, the fog and friction of war dominate the battlefield and make the
vanquished easy prey for armchair historians[.]”24
Human conflict, then, is enshrouded in this fog. From the platoon leader
attempting to maneuver his unit onto an objective to the commander of a carrier battle
group attempting to maneuver his force into position for a strike, commanders must
analyze their situation, make the best decision he or she is able and have that decision
carried out despite the gaps in their overall understanding of a situation. Nuclear
escalation control is not exempt from this; it too must contend with the fog of war.
At its heart, the fog of war is a problem of information management. As such, we
must understand the dynamics of that information management to judge how effectively
it can overcome the fog of war. A key aspect of information management is intelligence
collection. During escalation management, there are three key intelligence functions.
First, decision makers require “intelligence warning,” which is the “process of
communicating judgments about threats to US security or policy interests to decisionmakers.”25 Second, decision makers must have a clear "situational awareness," or the
understanding of the enemy situation, consisting both of where an adversary is physical
located and of what capabilities the adversary has at its disposal. Decision makers must
also have a clear vision of their opponents as human beings as opposed to mere

24 Setear, J. K. Simulating the Fog of War. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1989. p. 1
25 Mary McCarthy, “The National Warning System: Striving for an Elusive Goal,” Defense
Intelligence Journal 3 (1994).
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abstractions and, on that basis, consider what, namely what they might actually intend to
do and how they might actually react to any action taken by decision makers.
Yet the fog of war demonstrates that gulf exists between limited war in theory,
and limited war in practice. Examining the information management during the Cuban
Missile Crisis shows the practical limits of managing this information flow limit the
ability of national leaders to make such decisions properly. Using the Cuban Missile
Crisis as a vehicle to study the analytic pathologies that can affect information
management, it will examine:
● Collection Failure. Critical information is missed by the intelligence
community. Such oversights can come from the sheer volume of available
information, due to a technical fault or oversight, or simply due to deliberate
obfuscation by an adversary. It can also result from human errors in operating
intelligence collection equipment or from equipment malfunctions, resulting
in the presentation of false data for analysts.
● Analytic Bias. Information can be misinterpreted, misused, or dismissed due
to existing preconceptions on the part of both analysts and decision makers,
and overly granular reports given in parallel can often fail to provide decision
makers with the proper understanding of the situation that could have been
achieved by combining them into a more holistic assessment, resulting in an
analytic failure.
● Vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I) Infrastructure. The delicate networks and facilities required
for passing information and making assessments for decision makers are finite
and vulnerable to destruction; and overreliance upon such systems can, in the
case of their major disruption or destruction, render impossible the task of
analyzing incoming information, making decisions, and transmitting those
decisions to the proper recipients.
The following chapters will address each of these concepts. Chapter 2 will
explore collection failure in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, determining why
information that could have allowed the United States to escalate while the Soviet
Union’s total resolve was low was not detected. It will examine the challenges facing

11

analysts and decision makers caused by large information volume, and adversary denial
and deception activities, and errors in collection and information management equipment.
Chapter 3 will explore the various analytic biases that compounded the collection
failures during the Cuban Missile Crisis and nearly led to fatal misjudgments about
Soviet resolve. These analytic failures include poor analytic tradecraft on the part of
intelligence analysts as well as bureaucratic interference on the part of intelligence
managers and the senior advisors surrounding decision makers.
Chapter 4 will explore how the vulnerable C4I Infrastructure would have made
effective decision making during an escalation difficult, due to the destruction of
infrastructure critical to that decision making. This vulnerable infrastructure can be
broken down into three distinct types: communications infrastructure, analytical
infrastructure, and command facilities.
Finally, Chapter 5 will explore how the problems in the previous three chapters
not only remain relevant today but have become far worse. Advances in technology,
often thought of as the cure-alls to problems within government, are double-edged
swords:

Just as much as technology relieves problems, it also exacerbates them.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is a frequently used case study, in part because of the
wealth of available documents. It is entirely possible that other crisis periods, such as the
1983 Soviet War Scare, may have brought the world closer to war than the Cuban Missile
Crisis, and that historians lack access to the same amount of classified materials to
confirm this assessment. In any case, the Cuban Missile Crisis offers remarkable insights
concerning limited nuclear escalation control that remain applicable today.

12

2. COLLECTION FAILURE

Because it is typically thought of by many analysts and observers as the key
intelligence requirement within escalation control, “warning” consumes much of the
intelligence community’s time and resources. At a minimum, the ability to detect that an
attack is in progress has been a core mission of the nuclear enterprise for almost its
entirety of its existence. Warning is the “process of communicating judgments about
threats to US security or policy interests to decision-makers.”26 Warning is divided into
three distinct types. “Strategic Warning” is looking out to the “distant future” and is
primarily used to identify emerging threats to national security. “Operational warning” is
more granular and seeks to “identify indicators that an attack is in preparation.” Finally,
“tactical warning” exists to serve as the “immediate alerting function” that a specific
attack is underway.27
To better understand the differences in the three kinds of warning, consider the
familiar example of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Strategic
Warning indicators would have included growing Japanese belligerence and the fact that
their reliance on supplies of oil were vulnerable to US embargo. Operational warning
indicators would have included the Japanese assembling a carrier task force and
submarines and moving them toward Pearl Harbor. Tactical warning would have been
the actual sightings of Japanese strike aircraft flying from their aircraft carriers and
towards the island.

26 McCarthy.
27 Cooper, Jeffrey R. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence
Analysis. Washington, DC.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005. p. 16.
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During the Cuban Missile Crisis, strategic and operational warning proved elusive
for three primary reasons:

1. Information volume, namely that the information collected was so voluminous as to
overwhelm analysts.
2. Robust Soviet denial and deception, or actions by the Soviet Union which served to
obscure much of the signs that a significant movement was underway.
3. Collection errors resulting from equipment needed for intelligence collection not
working as intended, either due to mechanical failure or misuse by its operators.
Information Volume
Cuba had become a rapidly denied environment for intelligence collection, one
where the intelligence community had little in the way of taskable assets. Especially
after the failed Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency rapidly found
itself with few agents that could be tasked to find answers to specific intelligence queries
from analysts. The CIA maintained two major intelligence networks inside Cuba, known
as “AMTORRID” and “COBRA.” AMTORRID was located in the Cuba’s eastern
Oriente Province, while COBRA operated in the western Pinar del Rio Province. These
networks were primarily focused on paramilitary operations aimed at sabotage, and
though ran several dozen subagents and claimed to have over 2,000 informants28.
Because of a lack of taskable agents in key positions, the CIA was forced to rely
upon debriefing the flood of middle-class refugees fleeing Cuba. By October, 1962,
approximately 155,000 Cuban refugees were registered at the Cuban Refugee Center in
Miami, Florida29. Many of these refugees had no formal military training and did not
28. Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink
of Nuclear War. p. 122.
29 Thomas, John F. "Cuban Refugees in the United States." International Migration Review 1,
no. 2 (1967): 46. doi:10.2307/3002808.
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know what to look for to detect significant military activities. In the month of
September, 1962 alone, CIA debriefers interviewed 882 refugees, most arriving on the
daily Pan American Airlines flight that flew from Havana to Miami.30 The sheer volume
of individuals to debrief provided analysts a flood of intelligence reporting. This flood of
information proved to be a significant resource drain. Before 1962, only four analysts
staffed the Miami debriefing station. It was only on 15 March 1962 that an expanded
station opened, which would be capable of handling up to 150 interrogations per day.
Before this, the lack of debriefers likely resulted in missing vital information relevant to
Cuba.
Writing about debriefing procedures in 1963, a CIA analyst observed that even
standardized questionnaires did not exist, and consequently interrogators had to spend
considerable amounts of time performing multiple rewrites and clarifications, and
resolving duplicated data entries before the report could be sent to analysts at CIA
headquarters.31
Further, another CIA interrogator, also writing in 1963, observed that one of the
major limitations of intelligence collection in Cuba was that analysts and interrogators
were kept separate. As such, when interrogation reports reached analysts, any follow-on
questions would be delayed until the interrogator or case officer working that defector
could ask the question. In fact, the first joint debriefings did not take place until spring of

30 Dobbs, p.122.
31 Englejohn, Earl D. "For a Standard Defector Questionnaire." Studies in Intelligence 7, no.
Summer (1963): 53-55. Accessed September 29, 2016. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7283510.
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1963, further delaying the proper exploitation of on-the-ground intelligence coming from
Cuba.32
The interrogation guide issued to assist in interrogations in February, 1962, attests
to just how much data individual analysts were attempting to sift through to make sense
of events on the ground in Cuba. Comprising over 120 pages of questions, the Army
interrogators performing initial refugee screening were required to ask about topics
ranging from political developments, economic growth, militia development,
infrastructure construction, and security force dispositions. Of all these questions, only
two pertained to missile deployments. Worse, those questions were so general that they
applied to any missile system, from short-range artillery rockets to surface-to-air missile
sites.33
The US government also lacked the ability to manage the volume of information
that would have come with a US military attack on Cuba or a preemptive Soviet attack on
the United States. Once US forces were alerted to take part in a potential attack on Cuba,
scores of US units began to flow to assembly areas within Cuba. The overall commander
of the new invasion joint task was General Hamilton H. Howze, the commanding officer
of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The selection of General Howze came from the preexisting plan for an invasion of Cuba, OPLAN 316-62, which specified that the
commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps was to become the joint task force commander.
General Howze, however, had been sent by President Kennedy to command Army and

32 Layton, B.E.. "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. Summer
(1963): 57-61. Accessed September 29, 2016.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000608373.pdf.
33 US Department of the Army. Interrogation Guide for Cuba. Washington, DC: Department of
the Army, 1962.
16

National Guard forces assigned restore order in Mississippi after race riots broke out due
to the desegregation of the University of Mississippi.34
In order to facilitate the establishment of staffs required to handle the flow of
information coming in through military channels while also not tipping off either the
press or Soviet intelligence that an operation was underway, it was necessary to relieve
General Howze as commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and place him in command
of a new organization. Operations in Mississippi also complicated the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's attempt to track the situation. The Joint War Room (JWR) in the Pentagon was in
use monitoring the operation in Mississippi; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff
officers had to split the facilities and their communication systems, further complicating
the flow of information.35
As the ad-hoc force preparing for operations in Cuba began to assemble,
shortages in available staff officers became acute. Officers were borrowed from existing
headquarters from across their respective services. These officers had never worked with
each other before, and no established procedures existed. Air Force targeting officers,
essential for targeting during air operations, were in particularly short supply. These
officers worked 15-hour shifts seven days per week.36
Such shortages were only made worse by a lack of proper intelligence processing
equipment. Photo reconnaissance machinery, in particular, was scarce. Such scarcity

34 Pardoe, Blaine Lee. The Fires of October: The Planned US Invasion of Cuba during the
Missile Crisis of 1962. Stroud, England: Fonthill, 2013 p. 115.
35 Pardoe, p. 116.
36 Pardoe, p. 156.
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made tracking Soviet movements for targeting purposes difficult and was only made
worse by the massive influx of intelligence information arriving on an hourly basis 37.
Given the (fortunate) fact that the contemplated US military operation never took
place, it is hard to fully project how effective information flows during the operation
would have gone. However, several historical reference points provide useful insights:
Since the conclusion of the Second World War, twenty-five percent of all military
occupational specialties (MOS) categories within the Army were dedicated to combat
troops. The rest of these MOS were dedicated to supporting functions, to include
communications, staff work, intelligence, and command and control operations. By
1963, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, this percentage had fallen to 14 percent.38
This growth in non-combat MOS was to support the increasing automation and
complexity required in managing military operations as more advanced systems,
particularly communication systems, entered into service. By 1963, the message traffic
needed to control US formations was twenty times larger than that of 1945.39 The growth
of communications systems is also reflected in the growth of communication sources
during the Vietnam War. At the division level alone, radio communications jumped from
eight channels during the Korean War to thirty-two channels in 1963.40 One-quarter of
MOS were dedicated to communications-related functions.41 At the national level, the
amount of information flowing into the intelligence community through technical means
was also extensive. The Cunningham Report, a 1966 CIA Inspector General Report,
37 Pardoe, p. 157.
38 Creveld, Martin Van. Command in War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. p.
235.
39 Ibid.
40 Creveld, p. 238.
41 Creveld, p. 239.
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concluded that the flow of information from collection assets was overwhelming
intelligence analysts. “[W]e have come to realize that [analysts] are not the driving force
behind the flow of information. Rather, the real push comes from the collectors
themselves, particularly the operations of large, indiscriminating technical collection
systems.”42 Simply put, both management and analysts were simply unable to keep pace
with the rapid influx of information.43
Sandwiched between WW II and Vietnam, both of which experienced the
formidable collection and data management challenges described above, one finds the
Cuban Missile Crisis. The vast amount of reporting continued to challenge CIA analysts
after Soviet missile forces were detected in October. A key assignment for intelligence
analysts was to determine if nuclear warheads were present in Cuba, and if so, the
number and location of those warheads. The main intelligence source for this information
was imagery intelligence, both from high-altitude U2 spy-planes as well as low-level RF8 Crusaders or RF-101 Voodoos.44




Aerial reconnaissance detected the presence of Soviet nuclear warhead
transport vans on 23 October. These vans were easily identifiable, both due to
the large doors at the rear of the van and the prominent air vents to the cargo
compartment's front. Aerial reconnaissance then detected specialized crane
vehicles on 25 October at another facility. These cranes are specially
designed for safely loading and unloading the hefty nuclear warheads from the
transport vehicles. The two together are key for the maintenance and handling
of nuclear warheads.45
Additional American surveillance assets determined that the cargo ship
Aleksandrovsk, which had arrived in Cuba, had departed the Soviet Union
from a nuclear submarine base located in the Kola Peninsula. No civilian

42 US Congress, Select Committee on Governmental Operations, Foreign and Military
Intelligence, S. Rept. 94-755, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 346.
43 Bracken, Paul J. The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983. p. 32.
44 Pardoe, p. 161.
45 Dobbs, p. 174.
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cargo vessel had been observed visiting this port, and the facility was known
as a major nuclear warhead storage depot46.
These three pieces of intelligence were crucial for determining that nuclear
warheads were present in Cuba. Yet CIA analysts did not combine the two photos, as
well as the information about the Aleksandrovsk, until January 1963, a full three months
after the crisis. Further, analysts only made this discovery because overhead surveillance
had detected the warhead vans as Cuban and Soviet stevedores loaded the Aleksandrovsk
during the Soviet withdrawal in November 196247.
Additionally, the Soviet Union had also moved two tactical nuclear delivery
systems into Cuba. The first of these was the Luna, a short-range artillery rocket capable
of carrying a 2-kiloton nuclear warhead out to a range of 25 miles48. The other was the
FKR, an early cruise missile. This system was capable of carrying a 14-kiloton warhead.
Soviet forces brought eighty of these warheads to Cuba49. These weapons were intended
to attack the US facility at Guantanamo Bay, located in eastern Cuba. Yet, despite US
intelligence tracking the movement of these weapons, it was not assessed that they would
be used in a nuclear role50. In fact, US intelligence remained ignorant of the presence of
the nuclear warheads for these systems until the 1990s.51
Had the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated, American planners would have needed to
gauge the effectiveness of their operations against Soviet targets. After all, if the intent
of a limited war is to inflict sufficient damage to an enemy, it would be necessary to
46 Dobbs, p. 175.
47 Ibid.
48 Dobbs, p. 158.
49 Dobbs, p. 179.
50 Pardoe, p. 168.
51 Dobbs, p. 179.
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identify targets of reasonable value. For example, if a decision maker wished to inflict
damage onto industrial targets to compel an adversary to surrender, then it would be
necessary to understand which industrial targets were important to that adversary and
which industrial targets were comparatively unimportant. A tank factory in Nizhny Tagil
is not of the same importance as a shoe factory outside of Omsk.
Such assessments, however, require massive effort. For the NSA and its
forerunners, the cornerstone of economic analysis was the traffic that was available to it
via civilian radio links. Because it was unencrypted, it was easy to both collect and
translate. Analysts then attempted to piece together details about the state of the Soviet
economy52.
Working from clues as tenuous as a list of Gosbank account numbers that analysts
were able to link to Soviet defense industries, [the NSA] issued reports
identifying centers of munitions production, assessing the capacity of the Soviet
transportation system, estimating the output of vehicle assembly and engine
plants, and compiling basic production statistics for steel, chemicals, oil, and
electrical power.53
But since this radio traffic required the monitoring of all civilian communications
within the Soviet Union, the amount of information was voluminous. This analysis was
able to exploit approximately only 0.3 percent of all intercepted messages.54 This
statistic demonstrates two things: the sheer volume of information that analysts had to
exploit on a daily basis, and how much human effort must be expended to analyze the
information needed to identify key trends and locate critical targets.

52 Budiansky, Stephen. Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War
against the Soviet Union. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016. p. 110.
53 Budiansky, p. 114.
54 Budiansky, p. 115.
21

Information Denial and Deception
The mission of analysts was made additionally difficult due to the elaborate denial
and deception measures taken by Soviet planners in preparing for the movement into
Cuba.
The operation name selected by the Soviet General Staff, “ANADYR,” is
indicative of the efforts taken to obscure the nature of the movement should it have been
compromised. The Anadyr is a river that empties into the Bering Sea at the extreme east
of Russia. The intent behind this was to create the impression that the troops and missiles
moving to Cuba, if compromised by an intelligence leak, would appear to be moving to
Russia's Pacific Coast. To further the deception, the Soviet General Staff provided the
units with snow equipment such as skis, heavy clothing, and sleds. Such clothing was
suited to the arctic conditions in the Soviet Union’s east.55
Loading equipment onto ships for transport to Cuba was also the subject of
extensive denial and deception measures. Individuals from the ministry responsible for
cargo vessels were not authorized to know what operation was underway. They were
neither permitted to know the ships contents nor their destination. To plan the loads for
individual ships, an official from the Soviet Merchant Marine only knew the weight and
dimensions of each piece of equipment. Upon receiving this information, that official
then planned the individual loads.56
During equipment loading, the individual troops assigned to a given transport
were locked down at the port upon arrival and forbidden from communicating with the

55 Gribkov, A. I., William Y. Smith, and Alfred Friendly. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and
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outside world. Couriers hand-delivered all orders and ships were loaded only during
periods of darkness. Once an individual ship was ready to leave port, its captain was
ordered to proceed to a point in the open ocean, at which point he would be allowed to
open a set of sealed orders that ordered the ship to Cuba.57
Disciplined security efforts continued during the journey. Equipment was stacked
on the deck so as to make the ships appear to be carrying agricultural or construction
equipment. Larger pieces of equipment were hidden by erecting false superstructures and
flooring on the vessel to obscure the cargo. Hidden defensive armaments were installed
in such a way as to ensure that they could be used by the ship and its occupants should
they come under attack during the journey. Sensitive equipment was placed into lined
containers that were resistant to thermal imaging.58 Soviet soldiers were required to
remain below decks during the voyage except at night, and even then, they were only
allowed onto the deck for short periods of time. This rule was enforced in spite of the
heat and the lack of any climate controls below. To ensure that they were not detected
upon arrival and identified as combat troops, soldiers were issued civilian clothing to
wear. The intent behind this was to give the soldiers the appearance of being civilian
technicians dispatched to help develop Cuba's economy.
Upon arrival in Cuba, the denial and deception campaign continued. The
unloading of the cargo vessels took place under tight security. Unloading of the heavy
equipment and missiles occurred during periods of darkness to prevent their discovery.
Equipment, whenever possible, remained crated. Convoys carrying the cargo also took
place during periods of darkness.
57 Gribkov, p. 34.
58 Gribkov, p. 35.
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Such denial and deception operations were largely successful. The CIA, reporting
on the buildup, assessed on 20 August that while their sources indicated that there was a
growing presence of Soviet advisors, “there is no evidence of organized Soviet military
units, as such, being included”. Though reports coming from Cuba indicated the
unloading of sophisticated electronics, the CIA assessed that the cargo was either
“increased technical assistance to Cuban industry and agriculture and/or the Cuban
Armed Forces” or the “possible establishment of Soviet COMINT-ELINT facilities
targeted against Canaveral and other important US installations.”59
Additional collection sources, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), were denied
not just by the precautions taken by Operation ANADYR, but also by Soviet
communications security protocol. From the Second World War to 1948, US signals
intelligence had been able to intercept and decrypt large amounts of Soviet government
communications traffic due to poor wartime communications measures. On Monday, 1
November 1948, The Soviet Union changed all of its communications security protocols,
to include changing codes, encryption devices, and operational procedures. Known as
“Black Monday” within the NSA, the net effect of this change was to deprive the US
SIGINT enterprise of all SIGINT sources.60
The change in communications security across the Soviet Union had significant
implications for the US SIGINT enterprise. Without access to these communications, the
NSA was forced to rely other sources of SIGINT. The NSA was still able to comb
through the Soviet Union's internal civilian radio links, which were not subject to the

59 US Central Intelligence Agency. Director Central Intelligence. Memorandum on Cuba,
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same security requirements. Though this intelligence offered answers for some
intelligence questions (such as the state of the Soviet economy), it was not helpful in
building the robust intelligence warning that would have been useful during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.61

Collection Error
Error too can result in faulty information reaching decision makers. Human actors
from intelligence analysts all the way to the national decision makers themselves can
mistake mundane information as ominous, or miss ominous information entirely.
Technical failures can either produce false indications or cause analysts miss real ones.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the sudden arrival of nuclear-capable missiles in
Cuba seriously complicated the ability of the intelligence community to provide tactical
warning to the President. Previously, the main threat from Soviet Missiles had been an
attack that crossed the Arctic Circle, moving down against the United States from the
north. With the installation of missile systems inside Cuba, however, the United States
found itself with significant gaps in radar coverage. Though radar systems might be able
to pick up some indications of a launch, it would be impossible to do so with any
accuracy until it was too late.62
What radar coverage did exist was itself prone to error. On 27 October, the
tracking equipment installed at a radar tracking station in Moorestown, N.J. reported that
an inbound ballistic missile from the Gulf of Mexico. The trajectory for that missile
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contact made it appear that its target was US invasion forces staged in Tampa, Florida.
After a short amount of time, operators determined that a training program had been
inadvertently run, creating the illusion of an incoming attack.63
The increasing of alert statuses also has the effect of making false alarms more
likely due to the lack of familiarity with systems and rarely rehearsed processes.
Compounding this lack of familiarity is the fact many of the service members involved
likely had not worked with each other in any enduring capacity at all. At 1:00 a.m. on 26
October, a sentry guarding an air defense command center in Duluth, Minnesota detected
what he believed to be an intruder attempting to scale the fence. Believing the facility to
be an important-enough target to make an attack by Soviet saboteurs likely, the sentry
fired several shots at the figure, and then triggered the bases intruder alarm.64
In responding to this alarm, the night staff at the Duluth command center ordered
all interceptors under their command to “flush,” meaning they would take off from their
fields and await further instructions in the ground. One group of these interceptors, which
were carrying nuclear-armed air-to-air missiles, was operating out of a temporary base at
Volk Field. Due to the ad hoc nature of the field, the crews mistook the “flush” alarm for
a “scramble” order. Due to the growing amount of ice and snow at Volk Field, the
aircrews assumed that the scramble order was genuine, reasoning that they would not be
asked to take off under such hazardous conditions for anything other than an imminent
attack.65
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These fighters were preparing to proceed down the runway before being stopped.
The “intruder” in Duluth was later determined to have been most likely a hungry bear
scaling the fence to scavenge for food.

Summary
Intelligence collection, like all human endeavors, is not perfect. It must be
administered by human, using systems built by humans, and against other humans. As
such, these processes are prone to mistakes. Mistakes of those seen in the illustrations
above would not suddenly disappear in the case of a conflict perceived to be escalating
toward even a limited nuclear dimension. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, information
was voluminous. Such volume made missing certain key information possible. Such
collection would have only increased should the situation have escalated to the use of
either conventional or nuclear weapons.
As in all things surrounding human conflict, one’s adversary gets a say in the how
the proceedings develop. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, extensive denial and
deception techniques were used by the Soviet Union to reduce the amount of time US
decision makers would have to react to their actions. Deception operations had long been
a fixture in Soviet military operations dating back to the Russian Civil War and was a
core part of Soviet operations during the Second World War.
Finally, the equipment used to collect intelligence were not perfect and could
experience technical faults. Further, operators could use the equipment improperly. Such
occurrences almost gave inaccurate warning that an attack was underway, potentially
pressuring President Kennedy into escalating unnecessarily. It is also likely such errors
would have persisted during an armed escalation.
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It is in this way, then, that the fog of war influenced information management
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Had the crisis escalated to military conflict, President
Kennedy would have attempted to use the information being presented to him, processed
through his understanding of the situation, to determine which military actions to take to
terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its interests. To achieve
optimal results during this process, Kennedy would have required the most accurate
information possible. Yet as we can see, the potential for collection failure would have
denied much of that necessary information to Kennedy.
Many of these same issues remain today, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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3. ANALYTIC BIAS

Analytic bias is the result of the information being collected being processed by
the intelligence community in such a way as to present a false view of reality for decision
makers. This can occur in two key ways:

1. Barriers to perfect analytic tradecraft, which results in intelligence
information collected being misinterpreted or dismissed outright, most often
due to preconceptions on the part of intelligence analysts.
2. Bureaucratic interference can influence how intelligence is presented to
decision makers. This occurs when individuals within the government
misconstrue intelligence analysis or even outright refuse to accept or analysis
as it is presented. This can be because they are attempting to achieve a
particular political objective or personal information to or out of personal
bias. It could also be simply because they incorrectly believe the intelligence
to be incorrect.
It is worth noting that while the term bias carries with it certain implications, bias
does not by itself imply malign or nefarious intent. As the Aristotle observed, humans are
by their very nature political animals. “Nature,” he writes, “which makes nothing idly or
without purpose, has equipped them with speech, which enables them to communicate
moral concepts such as justice which are formative of the household and city-state.”66 As
such, even when consciously attempting to strike a neutral position, humans often act
with agendas without even consciously realizing it. This bias can simply be a matter of
the intelligence community, as an institution, wanting to make their customers happy.
Andrew Liepman, the former deputy director of the National Counterterroism Center, put
it this way:
66 Aristotle, David Keyt, and Richard Robinson. Politics, books III and IV. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2004. p. xvii
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In my job, my audience was pretty limited. You could say that I was producing
(crafting) products for one guy, which was the President. It’s really not as simple
as that, we had the Congress and the cabinet, but essentially if we wrote
something and the President thought it valuable “we win,” and that all of our
ratings go through the roof. And yet we had to be really careful. The President is a
pretty alluring audience. You can get sucked into that, by the power of the White
House, and you have to be really careful. We have a saying, “telling truth to
power is our job.” You don’t want to tell the President what he wants to hear, you
want to tell him what he needs to hear.67
The Cuban Missile Crisis shows many of these same dynamics at work. This
analytic bias resulted in President Kennedy being presented with inaccurate information
both during the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as throughout that crisis’
duration. As we will see, the results of that bias would have had significant impacts on
the outcome of any escalation.

Barriers to Perfect Analytic Tradecraft
Even when reports from Cuba began to filter into the intelligence community, the
collection and analysis process was compromised by both analytic failures on the part of
the CIA as well as the persistent manipulation (and outright rejection) of intelligence by
individual decision makers. The massive amount of reporting coming in from refugee
sources permitted analysts to “cherry-pick” their data to push “whatever hypothesis was
most fashionable at the time.”68 A National Intelligence Estimate, of 19 September 1962
assessed that the “establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which
67 Liepman, Andrew, and Howard Gordon. "How Accurate Is TV's Portrayal of Terrorism?"
Rand Corporation (audio blog), May 6, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2017.
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could be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently
estimate it.”69
CIA analysts made a series of assumptions about Soviet decision making that
were unfounded. Those unfounded assumptions then affected the assessments made
about Soviet intentions and actions in Cuba. A special national intelligence estimate from
12 September 1962, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” provides an insight into these
assumptions. Arguing from the outset that the USSR valued Cuba primarily for its
political value, the analysts argue that:

...the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the
Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be
a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The
Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro’s defensive
capabilities and by threatening military retaliation. At the same time, they
evidently realize that the deployment of an offensive military base in Cuba might
provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.70
Discussing the ongoing buildup, which by this point had already seen the delivery
of ballistic missiles and warheads, CIA analysts mused that the placement of short-range
surface-to-surface missiles may occur but was not yet happening. Arguing that there
would be a military utility to the deployment of larger systems, the Soviet Union would
not do so since “it would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in
US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far”.
When reports began to flow in that ballistic missiles were being delivered to
Cuba, analysts dismissed the sightings as ordinary surface-to-air missiles. Other
69 US Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation and
Associated Documents. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General,
November 1962.
70 US Central Intelligence Agency. The Military Buildup in Cuba. 1962.
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observers, to include those from other Western countries such as the United Kingdom,
skeptically dismissed reports of missiles, commenting that such reports were “wildly
improbable”.71 Further, despite the vast amount of data flowing in, there continued to be
certain intelligence gaps created due to a lack of assets on the ground. Such gaps led to
analysts having to make intuitive assumptions. In attempting to determine which military
facilities were Soviet and which were Cuban, intelligence analysts often used sporting
facilities. If a facility contained a baseball pitch, it was assumed to be Cuban, due to the
popularity of the sport on the island. If a facility included a soccer pitch, it was believed
to be Soviet, since analysts assumed Russians did not play baseball. Additionally, photo
analysts attempted to determine what kinds of units were at a given site by staring at the
gardens at each garrison, believing that Soviet units would try to recreate their regimental
crests using different kinds of flowers.72 While these assumptions seemed sound, Cubans
did in fact play soccer. Additionally, flower arrangements could just as easily be the
product of a local gardener’s imagination.
As the United States increasingly leaned towards a military attack, analysts
attempted to determine if nuclear warheads had arrived in Cuba and if so where those
warheads were stored. If a military action were intended to destroy the Soviet military
force in Cuba, finding those sites would be essential. This effort, however, was a failure,
mainly due to preconceptions about how Soviet nuclear forces stored their nuclear
weapons.
As early as 1960, the CIA had observed the construction of two concrete bunkers
near the town of Bejucal in western Cuba. The bunkers were constructed to be “blast
71 Dobbs, p. 123.
72 Dobbs, p. 140.
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resistant” and were secured by a single chain-link fence. As the crisis continued, U2
overflights of the facility were augmented by low-level flights by Navy reconnaissance
aircraft, which served to provide more detailed photos of the complex, none of which
showed any significant changes. Another facility, this one located in Managua, was also
photographed. This facility too also had a single fence surrounding several bunkers
similar to those at Bejucal73.
CIA analysts, examining the photos, dismissed both these facilities as being
possible storage facilities for nuclear warheads: “We were told to look out for multiple
security fences, roadblocks, [and] extra layers of protection. We did not observe any of
that” one CIA analyst observed later74. Instead, the CIA focused on a former sugar port at
Punta Gerardo, near Havana. This facility had an all the visible signatures of a nuclear
facility, including a large guard force and the highly-visible double-fence arrangements
that were standard to Soviet nuclear storage sites inside Russia.
The CIA analysts were wrong. Bejucal and Managua, despite lacking the obvious
hallmarks associated with Soviet nuclear warhead storage sites, were actually home to all
the nuclear warheads in Cuba. Bejucal stored 36 nuclear warheads for the strategic
rocket forces, while Managua stored all the tactical warheads allocated for repelling an
American invasion. Punta Gerardo was a temporary storage location for missile fuel that
lay in between the loading docks at Mariel and the missile sites at Guanjay75.
Soviet forces, upon their arrival in Cuba, had struggled to find proper storage
facilities for their warheads. Though CIA analysts assumed that the primary consideration
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for a warhead storage facility was security, the main Soviet concern in Cuba was meeting
the safety requirements for storing warheads and preserving operational secrecy. Colonel
Sergei Romanov, principally in charge of the transport and care of all nuclear warheads
assigned to the operation, had selected the site for three reasons:
First, the facility had an underground parking area that would allow for the
loading and unloading of essential equipment away from the prying eyes of overhead
reconnaissance aircraft. Second, the facility best met the physical requirements mandated
for the storage of nuclear warheads. Warheads had to be stored in a facility that was at
least one-thousand square feet, allowing enough space to store each warhead at least
twenty inches away from any other warhead. Third, safety regulations also mandated
strict climate conditions for nuclear warheads. The temperature in a storage facility could
not exceed 68 degrees Fahrenheit, and the humidity could not exceed 70 percent. The
facilities at Bejucal and Managua were small enough to allow Romanov to properly use
what few climate control systems he could scavenge from the Cubans to keep the storage
site at these conditions.76

Bureaucratic Interference
Once indications began to appear that Soviet missile deployments were underway,
officials within the Kennedy Administration actively interfered with collection and
analysis efforts. The CIA's failed Bay of Pigs invasion had left a poor taste in the mouth
of many within the Administration, and that colored their responses to Cuban
intelligence. John McCone was selected as CIA Director in 1961, a decision that made
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more liberal officials within the Kennedy Administration suspicious. McCone was a
Republican and had earned a reputation in previous postings as a strident antiCommunist, which many administration officials interpreted as coloring his
perceptions.77
McCone believed that the installation of surface-to-air missiles within Cuba was a
sure sign that ballistic missiles were soon to follow. Why install such advanced air
defense systems, he reasoned, unless they had something correspondingly valuable to
protect? Yet other analysts within the intelligence community, as well as Kennedy
Administration officials, were quick to push back against this assessment. Within the
CIA, the Director of the Board of Estimates, Sherman Kent, observed that his “intuitive
case” flew in the face of estimates from the US Intelligence Board and the senior
“Kremlinologists” who advised the administration.78
The Administration itself was equally resistant to McCone’s warnings. On 10
September, upon finding out that McCone wanted to increase the number of U2 spy plane
overflights, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy send a memorandum to the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR). In this memorandum, Bundy
demanded to know if “there is anyone involved in the planning of these missions who
might want to provoke an incident [with Cuba]”. Bundy, who had been criticized for not
being more active in opposing the Bay of Pigs Invasion, was seeking to ensure that no
such incident would occur again.79
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As intelligence of a Soviet buildup began to mount, this reticence continued to
exist among senior decision makers, informing the reception McCone’s reports received.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, on 21 August, hosted a meeting that included Secretary of
Defense McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and members of the JCS. During this discussion,
McCone began to list off the detected Soviet activities in Cuba. At this point, the CIA
still believed that Soviet technicians were installing surface-to-air missile systems and
intelligence collection equipment. Further, McCone focused on outlining the economic
situation on the island, arguing that the Soviet Union instead sought to grow Cuba’s
economy in order to serve as a “model for all dissident groups in Latin America.”
McCone, during this discussion, listed this information seemingly to galvanize the
group into more decisive action. In particular, the reports led to McNamara’s advocacy
for increased intelligence collection, sabotage efforts, and exile group-led irregular
warfare across Cuba to counteract Soviet assistance to the Castro regime, something
McCone agreed too, arguing that previous efforts had not been sufficient.
Bundy and Rusk, however, pushed back against McCone’s assessment again.
According to both Bundy and Rusk, they assessed that there was a “very definite interrelationship between Cuba and other trouble spots, such as Berlin.” Dramatic action, in
their mind, would lead to “similar actions by the Soviets with respect to our bases and
numerous missile sites, particularly Turkey and southern Italy.”80
This discussion demonstrates the internal fault lines within the national security
leadership of the Kennedy Administration and offers insight into reasons for the reticence
to react to the increase in intelligence reporting. Both Rusk and Bundy (claiming to
80 US Central Intelligence Agency. Director Central Intelligence. Discussion in Secretary Rusk's
Office at 12 O'Clock, 21 August 1962.
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represent the White House's view) were highly concerned that any overt action could
trigger another Berlin Crisis. This concern colored their predispositions and offers
another reason why intelligence was often not received favorably.
McCone's absence during September 1962 also shows this rivalry. Once McCone
was absent, Bundy was able to push for far more limited activities in Cuba, directly
undoing McCone’s efforts. Having recently remarried in 1962 McCone opted to go on
an extended honeymoon with his new wife. Before this, as demonstrated in earlier
meetings, McCone was the most forceful advocate for increased intelligence collection in
Cuba. In particular, McCone pushed for increased photo reconnaissance over Cuba to
monitor the Soviet buildup. Upon leaving, McCone had to rely on Marshall S. Carter, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to represent the CIA and its positions, during
meetings with other officials.
McCone, though absent, was in communication with Carter via a series of
telegrams. Carter, in these telegrams, details the ongoing Soviet activity and reports the
information that he had shared with the rest of the national security principles. Not
willing to be rushed, McCone noted that he would “remain [in France] as scheduled” and
would return at the time originally planned. During this absence, and despite his desire to
increase surveillance, U2 overflights were grounded until further notice, ostensibly to
avoid a diplomatic incident.81
Upon his return, McCone resumed pushing for increased intelligence collection.
Starting 4 October, McCone observed that the government had made no progress in
Cuba. McCone “observed a lack of forward motion due principally to ‘hesitancy’ in

81 "Eyes Only McCone from Carter." Marshall S. Carter to John McCone. September 8, 1962.
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government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the
United States.” Continuing, McCone argued that “more dynamic action was indicated,
[and] that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered.” After this exchange, the
CIA was ordered to draw up plans for new U2 overflights.82
Exploring counterfactuals in history is a perilous task. With limited data, it is
hard to determine with certainty the genuine viability of alternative courses of action.
Hence, it is hard to assess whether U2 overflights would have continued if McCone had
opted not to go on his extended honeymoon to France. Further, even if U2 flights had
been authorized, it is also not clear if they would have detected missile activity.
However, what these documents do is demonstrate just how contentious the decision to
suspect U2 overflights proved to be within the CIA.
Particularly telling is the memorandum that details the meeting where McGeorge
Bundy questioned if U2 missions were being planned to provoke an incident. A
memorandum to McCone written on 1 March 1963, nearly 7 months after the meeting
took place, captures this tension. The decision to suspend overflights was significant
enough that McCone thought it important to reconstruct the conduct of the meeting from
the memories of the participants half a year after the fact83.
This contentious relationship between the CIA under McCone and other members
of the Administration continued as the crisis continued to unfold. On 5 October, McCone
met with McGeorge Bundy to discuss the subject of intelligence collection. McCone
argued that “restricting U2 overflights had placed the United States Intelligence
82 US Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Central Intelligence. "Memorandum of
MONGOOSE Meeting Held on Thursday, October 4, 1962" 1962.
83 US Central Intelligence Agency. Director Central Intelligence. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.
1963.
38

community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of
offensive capabilities in Cuba”. After observing this, McCone argued that the Soviet
Union would follow its buildup of defensive weapons with the installation of an offensive
capability “including MRBMs.” Bundy, on the other hand, pushed back against this.
Arguing that “the Soviets would not go that far” and that if they did it would not
appreciably alter the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union;
and that risking a military action over Cuba was "intolerable."84
As the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates, the challenge of information
management during escalation control does not end after collecting the information. The
analytic biases of the analysts can severely hinder accurate assessments. Further, the
managers and senior officials who receive that information, manage its production, and
pass it along to the decision makers, have great power in controlling the conduct of that
analysis. Consequently, those decision makers may be forced to judge an adversary
incorrectly or select the wrong course of action during escalation.

Summary
Ensuring that there is a flow of timely and accurate information to decision
makers is not just a problem of collection. Once the gathered, the information must be
analyzed, processed, and passed through a chain of bureaucratic way-stations before it
arriving a decision maker for action. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one can
observe those limits bedeviling the process throughout:

84 US Central Intelligence. Director Central Intelligence. Memorandum of Discussion with Mr.
McGeorge Bundy, Friday, 5 October 1962, 5:15pm. By John McCone.
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Analysts failed to apply proper analytical tradecraft to ensure the assessments
they were providing to decision makers was, in fact, accurate. Worse, much of this
assessment making was done during periods of relative calm. It is difficult to assess what
effect placing analysts under prolonged pressure would have had on the quality of
intelligence assessments, but it is hard to see that impact as being a positive one. Further,
these assessments were not being made during an escalation. The Cuban Missile Crisis
never became conventional military battle, let alone a nuclear one. These analysts would
have faced a far more dynamic and uncertain environment once the fog of war descended
over events.
Information flow is critical to decision making. Information, as the saying goes,
is power. Yet that same power is essential for managers, policy makers, and executives
throughout the bureaucracy. By controlling it, those middle managers have a great ability
to influence events in a manner favorable for their preferred agendas. The documents
from the Crisis and the interviews after make it clear that these people sought to serve
their country to their best ability. But they served it with the unique personal and
professional perspectives they brought from their place in the decision chain. Even if the
agenda was well-intentioned, it was an agenda nonetheless; and during the lead up to the
Cuban Missile Crisis, it was that well-intended infighting that allowed the situation to
escalate far more extensively than intended.
Had an escalation control scenario taken place, these analytic failures would have
provided Kennedy with inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information, which in turn
would have meant he was making decisions with that inaccurate information. As
discussed in the previous chapters, the very process of escalation control relies on a
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decision maker being able to make the right decision at the right time to achieve conflict
termination with the outcome most favorable to his or her national interests. If the
information presented to a decision maker is inaccurate, such successful conflict
termination becomes far more difficult.
Take the example of a car traveling down the interstate in the right lane. As this
car travels, it sees a slow-moving truck ahead, traveling in the same lane. Desiring to
maintain his or her current speed, the driver opts to move into the left lane to pass. Not
wanting to be cited for traveling in the left lane, that driver aims to change lanes at the
last possible moment. To do so, the driver gauges his or her speed to ensure that the car
does not ram into the back of the fast-approaching truck. Judging by the cars speed
indicated on the odometer, and the assessed range to the truck, the driver judges that he or
she needs to change lanes within ten seconds.
But what if the indicated speed in the speedometer is incorrect? What if instead of
traveling at 60 miles-per-hour as indicated the car is, in reality, traveling at 80 or 90
miles-per-hour? Despite the driver deciding that, according to the data available to him or
her at the time, should allow the car to pass safely, the car would instead ram into the
back of the truck.
It is in this way, then, that analytic failures can cause decision makers, who are
acting in ways that are seemingly tailor-made to bring about success, can experience
substandard outcomes. This is true of statecraft in general and warfare in particular, and
nuclear escalation control is not uniquely immune to such challenges. Chapter 5 will
examine how these same challenges, which we can see during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
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still have relevancy in contemporary information management, and thus contemporary
nuclear escalation control.
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4. VULNERABILITIES TO THE COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I) INFRASTRUCTURE

All the discussions of assessment systems during the Cuban Missile Crisis are
built around the structure of an intelligence and communication enterprise that is similar
to that which exists in peacetime conditions. Those conditions change dramatically
during wartime conditions, when new interagency and military personnel augment
existing headquarters and establish new ones. These organizations must learn how to
function given these changed conditions. In addition to this, however, battlefield attrition
has a dramatic effect on organizational effectiveness.
Three key categories of facilities critical for the intelligence enterprise are
vulnerable to enemy attack during escalation control:
1. Communications infrastructure—all the facilities needed to transmit the
collected information to analysts, and then pass the analysis to decision
makers.
2. Analysis centers—those facilities needed for intelligence analysts to properly
analyze both collected information on enemy forces as well as determine the
status of the nation’s military and civilian populations.
3. Command facilities—the locations essential for national decision makers to
receive intelligence assessments, process them, and use that intelligence to
determine necessary courses of action.
Communications Infrastructure
By 1962, the US Government had created several hardened command facilities
with the intent of providing national leadership the ability to survive a nuclear attack.
Leaving aside the survivability of these facilities themselves, without the capacity to
receive new information from the outside world, and without a similar ability to transmit
both instructions and requests for further information, such survival is essentially
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negated. Yet the communications tools needed to maintain this connection were
vulnerable to Soviet attack.
In 1962, regular terrestrial phone lines and radio links transmitted critical nuclear
command and control information. Most radio transmitters were exposed above ground
and were thus vulnerable to the blast, heat, and overpressure of a nuclear blast. Most
civilian communications switchboards were also not hardened, and thus were also
vulnerable to enemy attack. In short, even if analysis centers and command centers
survived a nuclear exchange, there was no guarantee that they would be capable of
communicating their findings and follow-on orders85.
Before 1960, little coordination occurred between each military service to attempt
to ensure interoperability between communication systems. Each service procured and
deployed its own communications equipment, and in doing so not only created redundant
capabilities but also often communicated via media that were totally incompatible with
those of other services. It would not be until 12 May 1960 that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) would attempt to resolve this dysfunction by establishing the
both the Defense Communications System (DCS) and the Defense Communications
Agency (DCA)86.
When the first DCA director, Rear Admiral William D. Irvin, began to take
charge of the communication system, a massive communications infrastructure had
sprung up to support each of the major services. The services owned or leased a
combined 3.4 million voice channel-miles and 6.9 million teletype channel-miles. Each
85 Blair, Bruce G. The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1993 p. 139.
86 Krugler, David F. This Is Only a Test: How Washington, D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. p. 9.
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of these media passed a massive amount of information, with teletypes alone being
responsible for 110 million messages a year87.
One of the first significant challenges facing DCA would directly impact
communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the massive amount of traffic
traveling across the various services communications networks, the DoD had no manual
switching facilities to even begin to interconnect them88. By way of metaphor, each
services’ communications were like a series of train lines: Each of these lines carried
trains that had to deliver passengers or cargo to stops that were only serviced by other
services transit lines. Lacking manual switching stations meant that there was no way to
transfer one of those trains to the other services lines. The first of these facilities became
operational in the last month of 196289. As such, the DCA had no way to tie together the
disparate communications networks that comprised the DCS. Further, as the name
implies, these manual switching stations were not automated; they required human
intervention, dramatically delaying data transmission. Starting in 1962, the Army would
begin to automate some of the communications lines leased from commercial vendors.
However, automation would not truly be integrated into the DCS until 196490. As such,
not only were communications networks not properly linked, but each of the networks
was run at the speed of human intervention, which would have significantly slowed the
flow of the communications traffic essential for escalation control.
A previously classified 1966 study by the US Air Force summarized the
vulnerability of this system: Even if the President had successfully evacuated to a
87 Krugler, p.10.
88 Krugler, p. 59.
89 Krugler, p. 59.
90 Krugler, p. 62.
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hardened relocation site, “[w]idespread destruction of communications and command
posts would have probably have cut these survivors off from contact with the fighting
forces. . . and the nation’s leaders would not have known the outcome of the battle for
hours, perhaps days, after the last bomb had been dropped.”91
Leaders within the Pentagon, both civilian and military experts understood this
vulnerability. In 1960, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) published a
study it had performed on the survivability of the national command and control system.
After arguing that “delivery systems and local weapons control capabilities could outlive
the national political and military command structure,”92 the report went on to state the
following:
All primary communication nodes for missile and bomber system control are
vulnerable to direct enemy attack on terminal facilities, including wire systems
for land-based missile and aircraft, HF systems for airborne aircraft, and VLP
systems for POLARIS SSBNs. HF systems are susceptible to nuclear blackout
effects. HF and VLF communications to forces deployed outside of CONUS
(including SAC aircraft under Positive Control and SSBN's) are vulnerable to
enemy jamming and interference of increasing effectiveness as forces are
deployed closer to enemy targets93.
After observing this, WSEG’s report went on to point out that a “President could
not be confident, based on operation experience of exercises, that the whole system
would work perfectly.”94 Indeed, this system vulnerability was seen as completely
antithetical to the imperative to maintain absolute control of the US nuclear arsenal. The
problem was not just one of the President or another surviving official being able to
91 Krugler, p. 2.
92 Cremans, C. D., J. K. Moriarty, and J. Porturo. The Evolution of US Strategic Command and
Control and Warning, 1945-1972. Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1975. p
240.
93 Cremans, p 241. Italics in the original.
94 Creamans, p. 242.
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communicate with the US nuclear force. The breakdown of communications also
highlights the problem of determining who in the line of succession survived the attack,
along with the possibility that a comparatively junior official in the line of succession
could end up assuming control of the nuclear force over another senior official because
that junior official happened to gain a reliable communications link first. As the report
argues, “the possibility exists that the man to wield presidential authority in a dire
emergency might in fact be selected by a single field grade military officer” who happens
to answer the phone95. Such a determination makes no determination of the suitability of
that official to take command, nor does it ensure that that official would be sufficiently
aware of the situation to control nuclear forces effectively.
The Kennedy Administration recognized these flaws from its outset. Yet, due to
the limitations of the appropriations cycle during the 1960s, the first fiscal year the DoD
could begin rolling out significant changes was not in time for the Cuban Missile Crisis.
As such, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the communications infrastructure was
inefficient, vulnerable, not properly administered; and the personnel running the system
would likely have struggled to merely properly maintain situational awareness for
whomever in the line of succession survived, let alone provide reliable links for that
successor to the military forces.

Analysis Centers
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, many key intelligence facilities were in close
proximity to the national capital, including:

95 Creamens, p. 244.
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● The Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia
● The National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland
● The Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington Hall, Virginia
These three facilities were essential intelligence analysis centers. Despite the
threat to Washington, D.C. they all remained within 20 miles of the capital. Such
proximity is the result of political factors, both in Congress and within the executive
branch, which left the US Government’s analytical facilities exposed during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Starting in 1950, the US Government began a program of relocation,
intended to move as many as 40,000 essential government agencies away from the
District of Columbia and its outskirts to locations 50 miles away from the District.
Relocated facilities could not be any closer than 10 miles from the capital96.
Almost immediately, this process was met with opposition by both members of
Congress and federal employees themselves. One US representative proposed protecting
40,000 “government bureaucrats” by simply eliminating 40,000 federal jobs. Another
demanded to know how the President could propose to protect 40,000 civilian employees
while US service members were fighting in Korea97.
The government employees selected for relocation also balked. Many of these
civil servants resented the idea of moving out from their comfortable lives in the District
of Columbia to comparatively rural and less developed suburbs. One government
consultant estimated that approximately half of the planned employees slated to move
would resign or retire instead. As such, many of the essential government agencies

96 Krugler, p. 50.
97 Krugler, p. 73.
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needed for wartime assessments of both domestic damage levels and of foreign
intelligence remained in or around the District of Columbia98.
The CIA was no different. Having operated since its inception out of
approximately 40 Second World War-era temporary office buildings, by 1953 CIA
Director Allen Dulles was anxious to build a new headquarters facility that could house
all of the CIA’s employees under one roof. However, Director Dulles also recognized
and valued the access to national decision makers afforded by the CIA’s centrally-located
temporary housing. Consequently, Dulles hedged his bets. The new CIA Headquarters
would be in Langley, Virginia, a mere seven miles from the center of the District of
Columbia. Dulles chose Langley both because he had enjoyed attending cocktail parties
at the estates located in the surrounding area while assigned to the Department of State in
the 1920s and because the location afforded him a short commute to the White House. 99
In his attempt to remain close to the capital, Dulles was successful. But
consequently, the Central Intelligence Agency in October 1962 ended up with a facility
designed to house nearly 10,000 intelligence analysts and support employees well within
the blast radius of any nuclear weapon targeted on Washington, D.C100.
The CIA was not the only analysis center that remained dangerously close to the
capital. The NSA had been previously at Arlington Hall, Virginia, a short distance away
from the Pentagon101. The NSA, recognizing the risk of nuclear attack, began to look for
a location to house its new headquarters that would be safely distant from the capital.
NSA officials considered a multitude of potential sites. These included facilities in
98 Krugler, p. 62.
99 Krugler, p. 103.
100 Krugler, p. 103.
101 Budiansky, p. 10.
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Colorado, Wyoming, Texas, Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio. More exotic solutions were
also discussed, including a ship that remained on constant patrol out in the Atlantic
Ocean102.
NSA leadership eventually decided to build the new headquarters at Fort Knox,
Kentucky. This plan immediately faced opposition for two key reasons. First, like the
civilian employees of many other agencies, those working for the NSA opposed any
move that would require relocating from the comfortable environs of the District of
Columbia. The initial field survey published by the NSA to address some of the concerns
NSA employees were already raising stated that “the region is neither a wilderness, nor
undesirable...any normal Washingtonian can be as comfortable and happy in this area as
any.”103
Second, the NSA at the time of the move had a sizable African-American
workforce, which had worked during World War II in support of Arlington Hall's efforts
to break German codes. Initially, they had been brought on board to load tapes into
computer terminals and to scan intercept reports for specific words. This nucleus of
African American employees would continue to work at the NSA in increasingly highranking positions through the 1950s and beyond104. However, this minority workforce
also helped prevent a move to Fort Knox. Any move to Fort Knox would mean these
employees would have to live in Kentucky—at the time a segregated “Jim Crow” state. A
survey party attempted to paper over this objection as well, noting that segregation “is
accomplished without noticeable friction as an accepted principle of long-established

102 "Finding a Home for the AFSA 1949-1952." Cryptolog, April 1985, 1-2.
103 Budiansky, p. 178.
104 Budansky, p. 118-119.
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social order…[segregation] appears to be no problem for either the whites or the [African
Americans] native to the area”, even if it would require “adjustments” on the part of
NSA’s minority employees105.Needless to say, these two factors resulted in extreme
discontent on the part of the NSA’s employees.
Given that these employees had very rare skills that were difficult to locate, these
objections soon resulted in the NSA’s being directed to build its new headquarters in Fort
Meade, Maryland in February, 1952. The new headquarters would be completed in
1957106. Though Fort Meade was still relatively close to Washington, and even closer
proximity to Baltimore, security considerations took a back seat to workforce
considerations. Thus, the NSA headquarters was actually out of the damage radius of a
Soviet warhead, though a follow-on attack or an errant missile could have easily
destroyed the above-ground structure.
The DIA, only recently established at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
occupied the buildings vacated by the NSA upon its move to Fort Meade107. Though
small, the DIA would provide vital intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Arlington Hall sits approximately 2.5 miles away from the Pentagon.
All of the agencies responsible for human intelligence and all source analysis
were all located within the likely blast ring of a Soviet nuclear attack. Due to political and
workforce considerations, the three key agencies necessary to provide the timely and
accurate intelligence required to support escalation control would likely be destroyed
early on after during the outbreak of hostilities.
105 Budansky, p. 178-179.
106 Budansky, p. 179.
107 "Defense Intelligence Agency." History. Accessed November 16, 2016.
http://www.dia.mil/About/History/.
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In 1962, however, an even more fundamental problem prevented these
intelligence agencies from passing intelligence information to decision makers: In the
event of escalation into actual conflict, President Kennedy and other leaders would have
most likely moved to hardened command facilities to increase the likelihood that they
would survive a Soviet nuclear attack. However, it was not until 16 October 1962 that
Secretary of Defense McNamara would direct the military to properly integrate these
civilian analysts into communications planning108, and it would not be until 15 July 1963
that employees from these agencies would become a part of national command posts on a
full-time basis109.
A final challenge that reduced the effectiveness of proper analysis centers was the
prearranged procedures between the DoD and these individual intelligence agencies. In
the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy complained about the watch
officers from these organizations who “sit and wait to be told-to be requested to make a
recommendation”. Intelligence agencies had watch officers providing some information,
but they did not readily offer that information to decision makers unless they were
directed to provide it110.
In February 1963, the Anzoategui Affair further highlighted this problem. The
MV Anzoategui was a Venezuelan-flagged freighter that was hijacked by Communist
revolutionaries in Venezuela and steered toward Cuba111. Throughout the event, Kennedy
was again frustrated at the lack of forthrightness from his intelligence analysts. Writing
Director McCone after the event later that month McNamara indicated that both he and
108 Krugler, p. 18.
109 Krugler, p. 27.
110 Krugler, p. 42-43.
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McCone had “agreed to have members of [DoDs] staff get together [with CIA’s staff]
and work out detailed procedures to effect better and closer coordination of emergency
actions requiring quick reaction.”112
In short, during the Cuban Missile Crisis the analytical centers essential to
informing President Kennedy should the crisis have escalated into a conventional or
nuclear conflict were vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. Further, these centers were not
properly tied into the national military communications networks and did not have
habitual working relationships with the command centers in which the President and his
advisors would work.
The DoD also understood this vulnerability at the time of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. In reflecting on the vulnerabilities that plagued the US Government as it entered
the 1960, the WSEG wrote that “installations, such as damage assessment centers, whose
capabilities are needed by command in the period after the initial strikes would be less
certain of destruction in the initial attacks if they were not collocated with important
primary targets that an enemy must include in his counterforce attacks.”113
Yet this was not the case. In the event of an escalation control scenario, the
analysis centers remained in large and above-ground facilities close to the Soviet Union's
most likely target. These centers also lacked properly established and formal working
relationships necessary for passing critical information. Finally, analytical centers also
lacked physical representation at the (notionally) survivable relocation sites where
President Kennedy or his successor would have sheltered during an attack. In short, if

112 "Anzoategui Affair." Robert S. McNamara and Roswell L. Gilpatric to Director John
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escalation control requires the flow of timely and accurate information to decision
makers, the US intelligence community was not postured to do so in 1962.

Command Facilities
Broadly speaking, command facilities have the following key tasks, which take
place both in peacetime and in crisis:

● Situation Monitoring. Command centers, as a matter of course, “must monitor
strategic intelligence, both from classified means and from open sources, for
indicators”114 that an attack or strategically significant event is underway.
Though the actual analysis and production portion for this intelligence support
occur at analysis centers, command centers are a major consumer of those
reports. Further, as a conflict escalates, the personnel assigned to a command
center may have to begin performing their own analyses as individual analysis
centers are forced offline due to enemy action or other post-attack disruptions.
● Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (TW/AA). Closely linked but
distinct from situation monitoring, command centers must verify if an attack is
underway. If an attack were determined to be in progress, command centers
must also determine its strength, composition, and probable targets. While
analytical centers, at least at the outset, perform strategic and operational
warning, it is the command centers that are responsible for generating tactical
warning.115
● Decision Making. Command facilities must provide decision makers—in this
case President Kennedy—with the ability to receive input from analysis
centers, digest that analysis, and confer with the key advisers such as the JCS
and other cabinet-level officials.
● Force Management. Facilitating situation awareness is an essential function of
command nodes. This awareness must be not just of the enemy situation but
also of the disposition of friendly forces. Such knowledge creates a “common
operating picture” (COP) that decision makers and military commanders can
use to determine what military assets (bombers, ICBMs, missile submarines,
etc.) are available during escalation. If that escalation takes place post-attack,
command centers determine which forces survived the attack and what
capabilities they still possess. For example, an ICBM site might survive an

114 US Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Nuclear Command and Control:
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initial attack during escalation but remain unavailable to attack targets until
repaired.116
● Force Direction. Escalation control requires the measured employment of
forces, both conventional and nuclear, against an adversary. Within a nuclear
context, it is essential to such measured employment to use “positive control”
and “negative control.” Positive control “describes those elements that assure
instructions to launch nuclear weapons reach the forces and will be carried
out.” Negative control, in contrast, consists of “controls designed to prevent
the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.” Command facilities, then, facilitate
escalation control by ensuring unity of command.
In 1962, the US government maintained the following major command centers:

●
●
●
●
●
●

White House Situation Room - White House, Washington, D.C.
Joint War Room - Pentagon, Washington, D.C.117
Mount Weather - Blue Ridge Mountains, Virginia118
Strategic Air Command - Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), Omaha, Nebraska119
Raven Rock Mountain Complex - Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania120
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) - Cheyenne Mountain,
Colorado Springs, Colorado121
● National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)- headquartered at
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland122
In addition to these facilities, there were several alternate facilities, located at
Barksdale AFB, Louisiana; Bunker Hill AFB, Indiana (later named Grissom Air Force
Base): Westover AFB. Massachusetts, and March AFB, California123. These facilities
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could replicate some of the facilities that existed at Offutt AFB in the event that enemy
attack neutralized or destroyed Offutt AFB.
Additional support squadrons were located at four additional sites:






Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
Lincoln AFB, Nebraska
Lockbourne AFB, Ohio (now Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base)
Plattsburgh AFB, New York.

These four squadrons could operate smaller airborne command posts flying in
EB-47L aircraft. Such aircraft had extremely limited capabilities but served as a further
command-and-control backup. For the purposes of the questions at hand related to the
Cuban Missile Crisis, we will examine three of the most likely facilities where decisionmakers would have taken shelter: The White House Situation Room, Mount Weather, the
Joint War Room, and Raven Rock Mountain Complex.
As part of the government’s relocation plans, provisions were made to move
President Kennedy and his cabinet to a secure location in the event of an attack. The first
location, mostly intended to provide some protection in the case of a surprise attack
before an increase of alert status, was the White House Situation Room, located in a
bunker directly underneath the West Wing124. In the event of a Soviet attack that occurred
before the decision to disperse the government, President Kennedy and approximately 50
other officials were to shelter in this facility, sealed behind 13 separate blast doors125.
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However, it was highly unlikely President Kennedy would have survived an
attack if he was sheltering in the White House's bunker. Still, the DoD created a
contingency plan to recover him post-attack. The plan assumed that a combination of the
White House's design and the likely location of a nuclear attack made evacuating this
bunker in a post-attack environment challenging since rubble and debris would obstruct
the shelter's egress routes. As such, a specialty rescue team, OUTPOST MISSION, was
assembled at Olmstead Air Force Base in Pennsylvania and was comprised of both
helicopter pilots and rescue crews. This team would fly to the White House, remove
rubble and cut through damaged blast doors using acetylene torches, and evacuate the
survivors to a more secure relocation facility buried deeper into the earth126.
This bunker was located at Mount Weather, Virginia, referred to at the time as
HIGHPOINT. It was capable of sheltering 200 personnel from the White House and
elsewhere to continue to both lead the country and command and control the military
during a nuclear crisis. The facility was self-sufficient, maintaining its own power and
water generation, and had a variety of communication systems to connect the President to
the outside world. That same communications infrastructure was designed to tie President
Kennedy into the major broadcast networks should he want to address the nation127.
Another command post, this one intended to support the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the National Military Command Center (NMCC) was the
primary day-to-day location for military command and control. The NMCC that was
operating during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a product of the decisions made during the
changing strategic landscape of the 1950s. Initially, the Pentagon had no central
126 Dobbs, p. 105.
127 George, p. 71.
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command and control facility. The JCS had identified the need for a central command
post as early as May 1948, but planning moved slowly. The study recommended the
establishment of more hardened facilities, but construction moved slowly.128
The outbreak of the Korean War in 25 June 1950, however, accelerated the
process. In an attempt to keep track of all messages flowing in from Korea and Japan,
JCS officials converted an Air Force briefing room into an emergency command
center.129 This emergency facility would soon become the Air Force Command Post
(AFCP), capable of communicating with Air Force units across the globe. In July 1955,
the AFCP was designated as also serving as the national command post. Construction of
the underground Raven Rock Military Complex as an alternate location had begun in
1951. However, it was assumed any attack on the Pentagon or Washington would come
from Soviet bombers flying over the North Pole; thus, it was assumed that their slow
flight time would give personnel at the AFCP time to evacuate to Raven Rock by ground
or air130. By August 1959, the JCS had finally established the Joint War Room (JWC)
also within the Pentagon, with plans to facilitate evacuation to Raven Rock during
crisis.131
This development process, however, underscores the slowness with which the
JCS responded to the challenge of Soviet nuclear attack. The JCS established their first
command facility in haste at the outbreak of the Korean War. As time went on and the
Pentagon became vulnerable, the JCS struggled even to establish their command facility.
Even once established, it took even further time to recognize that such a vulnerable
128 Cremans, p. 116.
129 Creamans, p.118.
130 Sturm, p. 4.
131 Sturm, p 5.
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facility would not have sufficient time to evacuate. Thus, there is every indication that
the JWR could very well have been destroyed in an escalation-related attack during the
Cuban Missile Crisis before relocating its staff to Raven Rock. Accordingly, the JWR
was expanded in capability and renamed as the NMCC on 1 October 1962132.Raven Rock
Mountain Complex, or Site R, was designated as the “Alternate Joint Command Center”
(AJCC), intended to serve as a backup facility for the Pentagon's NMCC. By the time of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Site R was not in full-time operation. A small cadre of
personnel assigned to the facility on temporary duty would maintain the AJCC and keep
the site in a “warm standby”. In the event of a crisis that appeared severe enough to
threaten the destruction of the NMCC, personnel would be flown to the AJCC from the
NMCC at the Pentagon via helicopter, an approximately 30-minute-long flight. They
could also travel to the AJCC by ground, an almost 50-mile drive.133
Each of these facilities, however, were vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the
Soviet Union. “Should even a few weapons all on the central high command, the results
to our retaliatory capabilities could be catastrophic” since “no other target system can
offer equal potential returns from so few weapons.”134 An analysis within the WSEG
report detailed that a Soviet strike would only require 6-10 warheads to effectively target
and destroy the White House, the JWG, Raven Rock, and Mount Weather. The variance
in the numbers was purely a function of weapon accuracy: the more accurate the Soviet
missile system was, the fewer the number of warheads needed to destroy a target
successfully. “Both the President and the [Secretary of Defense] and [Joint Chiefs of

132 Sturm, p. 18.
133 Sturm, p. 6.
134 Cremans, p. 296.
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Staff] levels of command are presently subject to operational incapacitation by the same
events”, the report concluded135.

Continuity of Government
A further limiting factor affected the utility of each of these three critical site
categories. The staffing of personnel at these facilities was not guaranteed, further
reducing the potential utility of these facilities due to staff shortages. Confusion and
transportation difficulties could have prevented even the small number of personnel at
these relocation sites from arriving. Other personnel may simply have abandoned their
post. The Supreme Court offers a clear example of what could have happened. Plans for
the evacuation of Washington D.C. directed that the Supreme Court would shelter with
President Kennedy at Mount Weather. As the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded, Chief
Justice Earl Warren was approached by Federal emergency planners and asked which
Supreme Court employees should be provided with evacuation passes. These employees
would be evacuated to relocation facilities. Chief Justice Warren declared that every
employee down to the elevator operators was “essential”. Upon discovering that no
provisions existed to evacuate his spouse, Chief Justice Warren declared that he would
not evacuate to Mount Weather as planned136. Not only is the available space for
relocation limited, but the people required to man those spaces may not report when
ordered. This concern for loved ones does not merely affect those who refuse evacuation.
Provisions existed within Mount Weather to forcibly prevent occupants from leaving in

135 Cremans, p. 243.
136 Krugler, p. 178.
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an attempt to determine if their loved ones in the District of Columbia survived the
attack137.

Summary
President Kennedy, or any of his successors, would have faced dramatic practical
limits on the ability to direct the affairs of government throughout the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Those practical limits would have likely only gotten worse if the most likely
target inside the Continental United States—specifically the Washington, D.C. area—had
been struck with nuclear weapons.
The doctrine of “Flexible Response” was in its infancy, and the tools required to
manage it had not evolved. But even in 1962, the proliferation of nuclear delivery
systems by the Soviet Union demonstrated that those same problems that plagued the
Cuban Missile Crisis were likely to continue. The ability to strike targets within the
United States made previously invulnerable analytical infrastructure, communications
systems, and command and control sites highly vulnerable. Though over the intervening
decades the United States would seek to construct many more of these sites, this
infrastructure would remain inherently vulnerable.
The intelligence analysis infrastructure was especially vulnerable. Given the
requirement to maintain large workforces, the impracticality of hardening their facilities
to withstand nuclear attack, and the limited space in already costly relocation sites, these
capabilities would have likely found themselves knocked out early during any nuclear
attack in, or even around, the National Capitol Region.

137 Ibid., p. 180.
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In Chapter 5, the modern day vulnerability of this same analytic infrastructure
will be examined to determine if the same challenges remain in a contemporary setting.
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5. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS

The Cuban Missile Crisis provides a wealth of examples of some of the practical
hurdles that escalation control could likely face in an escalating conflict involving the
employment or potential employment of nuclear weapons. Though the United States and
the Soviet Union avoided entering into a nuclear conflict, the Cold War experience still
highlights practical problems, which could severely complicate the theoretical constructs
that underpin escalation control. These practical problems fall into three broad
categories, which mirror the categories already examined in the case of the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
Because half a century of history has elapsed since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
and the intelligence community, military, and other relevant sectors of the United States
Government have had five decades in which to internalize the lessons of that crisis, it
may be easy to dismiss a study of escalation control in the Cuban Missile Crisis as overly
idiosyncratic. Such a dismissal, however, would be incorrect. Though much has
changed, fundamental problems still stand to complicate the neat theory that underpins
escalation control. By examining more recent history, one can see these same categories
of problems that existed in 1962 continue to exist today. Worse, many of these problems
are more pronounced today than they were in 1962.
The information management that decision makers require for is both fragile and
vulnerable to disruption. Information can be missed, manipulated, or misinterpreted. The
infrastructure needed to process that information is also finite and highly sensitive to
battle damage, the flaws that can corrupt the flow of the information required for
effective decision making can be divided into three broad areas:
63

1. Intelligence collected and forwarded to a decision maker can miss important
developments, either due to gaps in intelligence collection or due to an
unmanageably large amount of available information. This can be called
collection failure.
2. Information can be misinterpreted, either to inadvertent analytical errors,
technical failure, or deliberate manipulation in the service of internal agendas.
These three causes are collectively referred to as analytic bias.
3. The physical infrastructure required for information collection is sensitive to
battle damage. This sensitivity is referred to as the vulnerability of C4I
infrastructure. This section will examine each of these three limitations and
how each of these still exists in a modern context.
Collection Failure
As was discussed in an earlier chapter, there are three key sources of collection
failure. First, is information volume, namely that the information collected was so
voluminous as to overwhelm analysts. Second, is denial and deception, or actions by an
adversary to obscure much of the signs that a significant movement was underway. Third
is, collection error, which can result from the equipment needed for intelligence
collection malfunctioning, due to either mechanical failure or misuse by its operators.
Information volume. As stated in the Cunningham Report, the “[information]
push comes from the collectors themselves, particularly the operations of large,
indiscriminating technical collection systems.”138 Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
ability for the intelligence community to collect information has grown dramatically.
This growth in available information has kept pace with similar data growth in the private
sector. Writing on the subject of data collection in 2008 the Defense Science Board, the
Department of Defense’s science and technology advisory body observed: “the number
of images and signal intercepts are well beyond the capacity of the existing analyst

138 US Congress, Select Committee on Governmental Operations, Foreign and Military
Intelligence, S. Rept. 94-755, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 346.
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community, so there are huge backlogs for translators and image interpreters, and much
of the collected data are never reviewed….decision makers and intelligence analysts
[also] have difficulty knowing what information is available.”139 Further, it found that
“too often sensor integration occurs only when multiple sensors have coincidentally
(accidentally) collected complementary data, and the results of that collection were
serendipitously discovered to provide a benefit.140
The amount of data coming into the US intelligence community is enormous and
continues to grow. The Rand Corporation, tasked to study the problem of data growth in
the Navy’s intelligence collection apparatus, found that:

To understand how big “big data” is, think about the volume of information
contained in the Library of Congress, one of the world’s largest libraries in terms
of shelf space and number of books. All of the information in the Library of
Congress could be digitized into 200 terabytes, or 200 trillion bytes. Then
consider the fact that the Navy currently collects the equivalent of a Library of
Congress’ worth of data almost every other day.141
Such information volume has already resulted in the intelligence community
failing to provide timely warning to US decision makers. In 2008, the Pakistan-based
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba was planning a major, spectacular attack in Mumbai—
India's most populous city. The attack involved nine gunmen attacking six crowded and
prominent targets throughout the city with small arms and explosive devices142. Such a

139 Intelligence Science Board, Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence, Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, November
2008 p. 3.
140 Defense Science Board, p. 41.
141 Porche, Issac R., III, Bradley Wilson, Eric-Elizabeth Johnson, Shane Tierney, and Evan
Saltzman. Data Flood: Helping the Navy Address the Rising Tide of Sensor. Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 2014.
142 Mumbai Massacre. PBS Secrets. November 25, 2009. Accessed November 16, 2016.
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/mumbai-massacre-watch-the-full-episode/536/.
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terrorist attack is of significant interest to US officials. Pakistan and India are both
nuclear powers who have fought multiple wars since the partition of India in 1947.
According to reporting in the New York Times, the US intelligence community had
collected large amounts of data, including communications between the attack planners,
their preparation activities, and even much of their schedule. And while some
information was identified, exploited, and shared, much more was missed in the sea of
available data. The result was that the attack was able to take place without the US
intelligence community being able to provide proper warning.143
The resulting fallout surrounding the attack resulted in Indian troops moving to
the border with Pakistan to force Pakistan to provide more assistance in curtailing crossborder terrorism144. Such a movement could have potentially caused an escalation
between two nuclear powers, a crisis which would have directly involved the US
Government.
The rise of smartphones and social media accounts has also created new
opportunities for intelligence collection. Open source researchers have used social media
postings to track military deployments, even clandestine ones, with increasing success.
Two excellent case studies exist, both involving the tracking of Russian forces. The first
involves the undeclared involvement of regular Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. The

143 Glanz, James, Sebastian Rotella, and David Sanger. "In 2008 Mumbai Attacks, Piles of Spy
Data, but an Uncompleted Puzzle." The New York Times, December 21, 2014. Accessed
November 16, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/world/asia/in-2008-mumbai-attackspiles-of-spy-data-but-an-uncompleted-puzzle.html?_r=0.
144 "Pak Might Soon Move Troops from Border with India - Times of India." The Times of
India. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pak-might-soonmove-troops-from-border-with-India/articleshow/4660681.cms.
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second involves tracking the deployment of nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles
being deployed to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Coast.
I. On 11 March 2015, researchers working for the website Bellingcat, which
describes itself as “by and for citizen journalists,” published a study that demonstrated
conclusive evidence that Russian Ground Forces units had traveled into eastern Ukraine,
undeclared, and participated in combat operations during the Battle of Debaltseve on 19
February 2015. Cued onto their possible participation by limited reports coming from
Moscow purporting to be from a wounded Russian soldier, Bellingcat researchers
scanned VK, a Russian social media service, for photos that would prove that his unit
(the 5th Tank Brigade), was in Ukraine. Despite removing the unit identification
markings from their tanks and fighting vehicles, Bellingcat researchers could use
distinctive landmarks (such a train station platforms, mountains, and other unique
architecture) to track the unit's movement. As such, Bellingcat could follow the group
from its home station in Buryatia, Siberian District to training facilities further west, and
eventually into Ukraine. The photos then confirmed that the 5th Tank Brigade was
fighting around Debaltseve. One set of information demonstrated the value of intelligence
gained from social media. Soldiers in the 5th Tank Brigade kept two Siberian Husky
puppies as mascots. Using the photos, the journalists could track these dogs and their
distinctive fur patterns, then geolocate where the photo was taken based on surrounding
geographic landmarks145. These photos were freely available to any analyst with a laptop
and an internet connection.

145 Toler, Aric. "How These Adorable Puppies Exposed Russian Involvement in Ukraine Bellingcat." Bellingcat. March 13, 2015. Accessed November 27, 2016.
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/03/11/vreditel-sobaka/.
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II. In this case study, researchers employed at the Middlebury Institute for
International Studies at Monterey, California, also used social media. Also, making use of
VK, these researchers used photos taken of conscripts assigned to a unit equipped with
9K720 "Iskander" SRBMs (NATO designation SS-26 STONE). Wanting to verify their
movements to and from Kaliningrad, these researchers began to track the photos that a
conscript assigned to the unit uploaded onto his VK profile. Of value was a unique item
that the unit carried while on maneuvers and one that appeared in many of the photos.
Like many conscript militaries, the Russian army has a tradition of hazing in their
individual units. Called dedovshchina, which translates literally to the “Rule of the
Grandfathers,” this tradition involves newer conscripts enduring abuse from the
conscripts that are nearing the end of their service. Though this hazing frequently
involves physical abuse, in the SS-26 unit being tracked, this hazing consisted of
conscripts carrying around a distinctive suitcase filled with a sizable number of sex toys.
By tracking these conscripts and their suitcase he was forced to carry, researchers were
able to confirm deployments of the SS-26 unit to Kaliningrad, as well as some exercise
locations.
Researchers were able to ensure that this suitcase was not some another similarlooking piece of luggage, because the older conscripts required that the bag's couriers
inventory the sex toys at every location they deployed to as if the bag's contents were
accountable items. This research also yielded several insights into the unit's discipline
and morale: Conscripts at this nuclear unit were growing cannabis plants at their
barracks146.
146 Lewis, Jeffrey. "Iskander, INF and Kaliningrad." Arms Control Wonk. Accessed November
27, 2016. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1202123/iskander-inf-and-kaliningrad/.
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These two case studies would appear, at least on the surface, to paint a valuable
new intelligence collection tool; indeed, they show a way to leverage the ubiquitous
nature of smartphones and the modern propensity to post photos and personal information
on the internet. But this tendency cuts both ways. The number of photos uploaded yearly
will exceed 1.3 trillion in 2017147. One researcher estimated in 2014 that approximately
1.8 billion photos are uploaded onto social media each day148. This mass of data only
adds to the amount of material analysts must search through on a daily basis. As such,
collection failure due to an excess of information is likely to continue, as the surplus of
information available to analysts will grow at an exponential rate over time.
Information Denial and Deception. Denial and deception, particularly by
Russia, has continued to be a significant constraint to the providing of proper intelligence
warning to decision makers. The Russian seizure and annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula demonstrate the challenges faced in providing strategic warning for
contemporary leaders. In 2014 mass protests forced Ukraine's pro-Russian government
out of power. These protests, known as the Euromaidan Revolution, deposed thenPresident Viktor Yanukovych and brought a new, pro-western Ukrainian government into
power. In response, Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula, which housed the Russian
Navy’s most significant Black Sea naval facilities149.
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Russia did not seize the Crimean Peninsula through overt military action. Instead,
groups of armed Soldiers, lacking proper national or unit identification, began appearing
across the Crimean Peninsula. These “Little Green Men” as they were referred to in
western media quickly seized control of government buildings, Ukrainian military bases,
and other key infrastructure across Crimea. Referred to by the Russian media as "selfdefense militias," these groups claimed to be spontaneous uprisings of angry residents
who claimed to be defending themselves against a supposedly fascist government that
had taken power in Kiev150. These groups then began to support rebel groups that had
arisen in Ukraine's ethnically Russian Donetsk and Luhansk regions151.The nonattributional nature of these fighters delayed the United States and other NATO powers
from being able to identify these units as Russian. By the time the United States and
NATO were willing to publicly agree that the Little Green Men were, in fact, Russian
troops, Crimea was under the control of Russian forces152.
These tactics followed an emerging Russian unconventional warfare technique
called the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” named after the Russian Chief of the General Staff
during the Ukraine Crisis. Gerasimov detailed many of the same tactics used in Ukraine
in an article he published in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (VPK) (Military-Industrial
Courier), entitled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations.” Though
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Gerasimov himself cautions that every conflict is different and, as such, no one-size-fitsall approach is possible, Gerasimov argues that “indirect and asymmetric methods” are
required to counter supposed western interventions that take place under the guise of
Ukrainian-style “color revolutions.”153 Scholars such as Michael Kofman have researched
this concept and has raised doubts if such tactics constitute a formal doctrine. Many
armies, he argues, use similar tactics. Just because an entire Russian unit takes off their
identifying patches, he argues, does not mean that they have suddenly become a special
hybrid unit. But regardless if Gerasimov’s ideas have been adopted as formal doctrine,
the discussion surrounding them identify the challenge covert military action causes in
NATO Alliance decision making.154NATO circles fear the use of these tactics in the
Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All three of these countries have
ethnically Russian populations as Ukraine does. Further, such an effort to seize terrain by
similar covert means would allow Russia to both subvert NATO and create a land-bridge
to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Coast155. Should such an effort occur, US
collection could be slow to confirm the effort is being Russian-led until the only methods
remaining to the United States is a conventional conflict which risks a nuclear escalation
with Russia’s nuclear forces.
Collection failure. Collection error remains a significant potential vulnerability
during future escalation control scenarios. Given that discussions of the characteristics of
153 Bartles, Charles K. "Getting Gerasimov Right." Military Review, January 1, 2016.
154 Kofman, Michael. "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts." War on the Rocks.
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contemporary collection systems could compromise sources and methods, much of the
information surrounding system effectiveness remains classified and thus largely
unavailable. However, there are two current collection assets that have publicly available
data detailing system shortcomings: the JLENS and DCGS-A.
The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS) was designed to detect incoming cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft. JLENS
is an aerostat or a tethered lighter-than-air balloon, which aims to provide persistent topdown surveillance for upwards of 30 days at a time. In addition to providing early
warning of an incoming enemy cruise missile system, JLENS was also designed to
provide the fire control information needed for air defense sites and interceptors to
engage and destroy the missile before it reached its target156. The proliferation of foreign
cruise missile systems designed by Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China
prompted this system. Cruise missiles, due to their low thermal signature, small size, and
low flight altitude, are exceedingly difficult to detect with conventional ground-based
radars or satellite157.
The JLENS program, however, was beset with serious issues from its outset.
JLENS was unable to provide 30 days of continuous coverage as intended, requiring
frequent idle periods due to technical failure. The system proved especially vulnerable to
weather, a problem that doomed one JLENS deployed at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland’s Edgewood Area. High winds on 29 October 2015 caused the JLENS to break
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free of its tether and drift over 240km before crashing in rural Pennsylvania158. This
failure was due to a depleted battery that rendered the auto-deflate feature on the JLENS
inoperable159.
Worse, the JLENS also had digital communications issues. Auditors found that
the JLENS’s fire control systems were incapable of differentiating between friendly and
enemy targets. Those same systems struggled to maintain communications with the
overall national air defense network. JLENS also failed in real world scenarios to detect
the very systems against which it was designed to defend. Auditors discovered that the
JLENS “had certain features incorporated into its software intended to deal with the very
high target densities that exist. However, the design approach chosen to deal with this
problem resulted in certain target sets being excluded by the software algorithms
associated with the surveillance radar. This could result in some high-priority radar
targets not being processed and tracked.”160 On 15 April 2015, a postal worker was able
to fly over the capital in a low-flying rotary wing aircraft, despite JLENS being
specifically designed to detect objects flying in that flight profile161.

158 Stewart, Phil, and Yeganeh Torbati. "Runaway Military Blimp Wreaks Havoc in US."
Sydney Morning Herald, October 29, 2015. Accessed November 16, 2016.
http://www.smh.com.au/world/runaway-military-blimp-loose-over-us-20151028-gklaeq.html.
159 Atherton, Kelsey. "The Army's Runaway Blimp Escaped Due To...Dead Batteries." Popular
Science, February 16, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.popsci.com/this-onecool-trick-could-save-billion-dollar-blimps.
160 US Department of Defense. Operation Test and Evaluation Command. Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation FY 2015 Annual Report. By J. Michael Gilmore. 21.
161 "How a $2.7 Billion Air-defense System Became a 'Zombie' Program." The Los Angeles
Times, September 24, 2015. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://graphics.latimes.com/missiledefense-jlens/.
73

JLENS remains in development, and is still intended for fielding to defend the
National Capital Region as of this writing.162. However, the failings already
demonstrated by this system demonstrate the enduring challenge of collection error in the
contemporary environment, one which has real implication for future escalation control
scenarios. An unreliable warning system like JLENS could cause decision makers to opt
to escalate due to a concern that an attack could go undetected and thus prevent them
from being able to issue commands to US forces.
Another example of collection failure is the Department of Defense’s Distributed
Common Ground System-Army, or “DCGS-A.” This system, as described by the
Department of the Army, is an “intelligence program that enables operational
visualization, situational awareness, current and future operations.”163 In short, DCGS-A
is intended as a multi-service intelligence processing system. It is designed to take
collection data, combine it with existing data that is stored on central servers, and “fuse”
that information into products that can be used to better understand the operational
environment. “DCGS-A provides Commanders the ability to track and task battle-space
sensors and receive intelligence information from multiple sources, and will facilitate
‘Seeing’ and ‘Knowing’ on the battlefield.”164
DCGS-A has demonstrated significant problems in accomplishing this mission,
however. The system, as it was fielded, was met with persistent criticisms from its users.
A report from November 2013 commented that DCGS-A was “unstable, slow, not
162 Sterk, Richard. "JLENS Will Be Produced, but Not in Numbers Once Expected." Forecast
International, October 10, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016.
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friendly and a major hindrance to operations,” with units complaining that DCGS-A
upgrades would delete all data saved on the systems. Even worse, these same persistent
problems would result in DCGS-A not working for 5 calendar days every month due to
repair and maintenance requirements165.
These problems continued throughout the systems rollout. In one 2014 incident,
units operating DCGS-A observed that the system continued to be unreliable. In one case,
10 hours of targeting analysis necessary for an attack was deleted permanently due to a
system malfunction that was no fault of the operators. The system also struggled to
connect to the necessary databases required to function, failed to search for information
accurately, and prevented users from being able to navigate between reports
effectively.166 In short, DCGS-A was failing to properly perform its function analyzing
collection data.
On 3 October 2015, Army Special Forces operating inside Kunduz, Afghanistan
requested an airstrike against what they believed to be a Taliban position close to their
position. An AC-130 destroyed the compound, firing over 200 rounds against the target,
which turned out to be not a Taliban position but rather a hospital run by Doctors Without
Borders. The ensuing investigation indicated that the AC-130 did not have the database
that listed hospitals uploaded onto its computers.167 In later investigations, it was
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determined that DCGS-A was not operational during the period of the strike. One of the
roles of DCGS-A was to cross-reference intelligence collection feeds and combine them
with databases of known hospital locations. As such, the AC-130 when departing for its
mission did not have the information it needed because DCGS-A was offline.168
One counterargument to these examples is that both JLENS and DCGS-A are
new, complex, and relatively immature systems that are currently undergoing extensive
research and development. There are any number of systems in the Department of
Defense that go through lengthy and problem-filled development cycles before having
long and valuable service lives. This is undeniably true. However, during the time it takes
to develop these systems into useful and reliable platforms, those same systems still result
in collection errors. As the Kunduz strike example demonstrates, those development
hurdles can have significant consequences, and though systems like DCGS-A may
eventually become useful and reliable systems, decision makers and the intelligence
community still must contend with their problems until those systems reach maturity.

Analytic Bias
As was discussed in Chapter 2, analytic bias can occur in three key ways. First,
poor analytic tradecraft results in intelligence information collected being misinterpreted
or dismissed outright, most often due to preconceptions on the part of intelligence
analysts. Second, bureaucratic interference can influence the presentation of information
to decision makers, occurring when individuals within the government misconstrue
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/world/asia/afghanistan-doctors-without-borders-hospitalstrike.html.
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intelligence analysis or even outright refuse to accept it as presented, so as to either serve
a particular political objective or personal bias, or simply because they are unable to
accept the report’s finding due to their own preconceptions. Third, insufficient
aggregation of intelligence can present decision makers situational awareness that is
insufficiently nuanced. Such a lack of nuance results from overly granular reports given
in parallel that can fail to provide decision makers with the proper understanding that
could have been achieved by combining those reports into a more holistic assessment.
In the time between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the present day, these
intelligence community has undertaken numerous efforts to improve its analytic
performance. One example of this is the Team B effort. Desiring a “competitive
estimate” to determine if CIA assessments of Soviet doctrine were accurate, Team B was
an effort to bring in outside analysts to review CIA intelligence. Releasing their report in
1976, Team B argued that indeed the CIA had been too dovish in its assessments of the
Soviet Union.
Team B, however, had its issues. To quote a later CIA history examining Team
B’s effectiveness:
In retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it
is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms of the NIE proved to be wrong.
On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and "corrected" the official
estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat. For
example, the range of the Backfire medium bomber was considerably overestimated, and
the number of Backfires the Soviet Union would acquire by 1984 was overestimated by
more than 100 percent (estimating 500 when the real figure was 235). … It regarded as
ominous, rather than reassuring, that no intelligence information had been acquired on
Soviet development of a nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capability, again raising
concerns over a looming threat that did not arise.169
169 Gartoff, Raymond. "Chapter V." Center for the Study of intelligence. June 28, 2008.
Accessed April 17, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi77

Team B, though it had its flaws, showed an interest in ensuring that the
intelligence community remained objective in its analysis. In the area of strategic
warning alone, the Central Intelligence Agency undertook five such studies from 19951999 alone170. Yet in spite of this, analytic failure continues to be an issue within the
intelligence community. While the intelligence community at large attempts to improve
its analytic tradecraft, it is a discipline that must operate at times with limited
information. As such, just as analytic failure bedeviled the proper flow of information to
decision makers during the planning for potential military escalation in Cuba, due both to
the personal bias of policymakers, analysts, and to faulty assumptions, intelligence is still
open to errors in analytical thinking, and the flow and use of that intelligence is
vulnerable to misuse by interested parties attempting to advance specific agendas.
Three cases in recent years demonstrate enduring analytic bias. The first is faulty
assumptions underlying intelligence that helped lead to the 2003 Iraq War. The second is
a dispute between Ambassador John Bolton and intelligence analysts within the State
Department’s intelligence division, over the former’s claims that Cuba maintained an
active offensive biological weapons program. The third example is that of Ana Montes
and the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue incident, in which her management of interactions
between government officials and unofficial diplomatic messengers from Cuba resulted

publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-sovietunion/article05.html.
170 Davis, Jack. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning." Center for
Intelligence Analysis. January 03, 2012. Accessed April 17, 2017.
https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no1.htm.
78

in the Clinton Administration finding its available options to resolve a crisis being limited
from that crisis’ outset.
I. Poor analytic tradecraft. Perhaps the best known incident in recent years of
faulty assumptions leading to inaccurate intelligence reporting used by decision makers
was the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), produced in December of 2002
during the lead-up to the Iraq War. That particular NIE asserted that Iraq “has continued
its weapons of mass destruction program in defiance of United Nations resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with
ranges exceeding United Nations restrictions; if left unchecked, it will likely have a
nuclear weapon during this decade."171
Intelligence analysts, while preparing this report, used several key assumptions
into their analysis, assumptions which later proved to be faulty. These assumptions
resulted in inaccurate assessments of the scope of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
program. First, intelligence analysts assumed that since they had failed to correctly
capture the scale of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs before the
1991 Gulf War due to the regime's denial and deception programs, any absence of
evidence must be the result of similar deception efforts.172 Second, intelligence analysts
assumed that previous assessments were accurate, and then built on those assessments to
produce future reports. Earlier reports had indicated that Saddam Hussein had a major
weapons of mass destruction program and so new reporting did the same. Once that
initial faulty reporting made it into the assessment, it created the appearance that the
171 US Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Central Intelligence. Iraq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC, 2002.
172 Immerman, Richard H. "Intelligence and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars." Political Science
Quarterly 131, no. 3 (2016): 477-501. doi:10.1002/polq.12489.
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analysis was more comprehensive than it was in reality.173 Finally, analysts assumed that
Saddam Hussein’s regime had a coherent plan for developing weapons of mass
destruction. The regime had acquired chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, it had
continued to produce them during the Gulf War, and after the Gulf War, it appeared to be
continuing with the chemical weapons program. Consequently, analysts assumed that
Saddam Hussein had a coherent plan centered on acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
when in fact Hussein had no such intentions.174
One counterargument to this was that Saddam Hussein himself encouraged the
perception that Iraq maintained a chemical weapons stockpile. If the state in question is
signaling that it maintains a WMD program, how can analysts be expected to judge
otherwise. The problem with this counterargument, however, is that state deception
programs are a common issue faced by intelligence agencies. As discussed in the Cuban
Missile Crisis example, states will often attempt to conceal their intentions from the eyes
of intelligence agencies with deliberate deception programs. Indeed, the best deception
programs are those that present an image to an adversary that an adversary expects to see.
Consequently, proper analytic tradecraft would have solved this problem.
In this way, then, one can see how even in contemporary times, and even after
numerous attempts to improve analytic tradecraft, how faulty assumptions still can
severely warp intelligence assessments and consequently alter a decision maker's
perception of a potential adversary. Further, one also can see how decision maker bias
can also make the transmittal of accurate information more difficult.
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II. Bureaucratic interference. In May of 2002, Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton announced that Cuba was
maintaining an active offensive biological weapons program. “The United States believes
that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development
effort,'' Bolton announced, continuing that Cuba had ''provided dual-use biotechnology to
other rogue states.”175 In response to this, Bush Administration officials announced that
the United States would tighten sanctions against Cuba.176
Soon after this announcement, however, other officials within the Bush
Administration began to walk back this statement. When interviewed at a meeting of
NATO leaders being held in Iceland, then Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “we
do believe Cuba has a biological offensive research capability...we didn't say it actually
had some weapons, but it has the capacity and capability to conduct such research.”
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice clarified further, stating “'you can't show
someone a biotech lab and be assured they're not creating weapons of mass destruction.
That's not how biotech weapons work. And they're actually very easy to conceal and you
need multiple measures to make certain biotech weapons aren't being developed and
transferred.”'177
In April 2005, nearly three years later, Ambassador Bolton was nominated to
become the US Ambassador to the United Nations. During his nomination hearings, it
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was alleged by Christian Westermann and Carl Ford Jr, both from the State Department’s
Intelligence and Research Division, had testified that Bolton attempted to pressure them
into changing their intelligence assessments to paint what they viewed was a grimmer
picture of Cuba's potential biological weapons program. Ford, during testimony to
Congress, asserted that after Westermann had refused to change Cuban intelligence for
Bolton, the Ambassador called Westermann into his office and “reamed him a new
one.”178
After this incident, Powell opted to visit Intelligence and Research and inform the
staff there that they were to continue “speak truth to power” in their intelligence
assessments. Ford, commenting on the incident in Congress, remarked that “There are a
lot of screamers that work in government. But you don't pull somebody so low down the
bureaucracy that they are completely defenseless. It's an 800-pound gorilla devouring a
banana.”179
A counterargument to this example is that Bolton, while defending himself,
asserted that he had felt the intelligence assessments on Cuba being produced by
Intelligence and Research (INR) were “too cautious.” Because he thought they were too
cautious, and because the threat a biological weapons program would pose, Bolton felt
that assessment an assessment that identified Cuba as a state maintaining an offensive
biological weapons program was necessary despite the information having lower than
normal confidence levels.
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The problem with this argument is that it still shows how elements within the
bureaucracy are altering an intelligence product to one particular point of view or
another. The purpose of this example is not to cast judgment on either of the participants.
Rather, it is to show that both Bolton and INR cannot both be right. The first option is
that Cuba actually has a biological weapons program, and that INR has been creating
inaccurate reports that say the opposite. The second option is that Bolton was incorrect,
and that Cuba does not have an offensive biological weapons program. In this telling, it is
Bolton who is attempting to pass along inaccurate intelligence that can influence decision
makers.
Again, this does not imply any malign intend on the part of either party. Different
individuals and organizations view the same sets of information differently. But only one
individual group can be right. Further, both offices could be seen to have agendas. In the
case of INR, their pushback against a more substantive intelligence assessment could be
seen as an attempt to maintain a degree of independence, or an attempt to impose a more
robust standard for intelligence assessments. In the case of Bolton, on the other hand,
either Bolton is attempting to push the administration to take a more hardline position on
Cuba despite objections within the administration (as evidenced by the immediate
pushback from both the national security advisor and the secretary of state), or an attempt
to impose his own standards on INR’s intelligence review process.
Another example of distortion case of Ana Montes, a Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) arrested in September 2001 for spying on behalf of the Cubans is
instructive of how a sufficiently high-placed analyst can seriously influence how national
decision makers operate during escalation control. Montes was recruited by Cuban
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intelligence in 1984 while an employee of the US Justice Department, and upon being
recruited applied and was accepted by the DIA as an analyst.180 At the time of her arrest,
Montes was considered to be one of the government's best Cuba analysts,181 earning her
the nickname within the intelligence community as the “Queen of Cuba.”182
On 24 February 1996, Cuban fighter aircraft shot down two private planes flown
over international waters by Brothers to the Rescue, an aid organization that frequently
overflew Cuba to drop anti-Castro leaflets.183 After the shoot down occurred, retired
Admiral Eugene Carroll came forward publicly to claim that while on a visit to Cuba
sponsored by the Center for Defense Information, a left-leaning defense think-tank,
representatives from the Cuban government had warned him in advance that the Cuban
Air Force might shoot down these aircraft should they continue to operate, and stated that
he passed those warnings to government officials.184
The result was a public relations crisis for the Clinton Administration.185 Rather
than public attention being focused on Cuba’s involvement in shooting down of two
civilian aircraft over international water, the focus was instead on why the Clinton
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Administration had failed to put a stop to the flights after being told by Cuba that they
were prepared to take action.186 Carroll’s comment managed, therefore, to badly set back
the Clinton Administration’s crisis management.
Yet for some within the DIA, looking back at the incident in hindsight, the timing
seemed too neat to be entirely coincidental. Just one day before the shoot down, Cuban
officials had managed to meet with Carroll, a source known to be critical of US policy
towards Cuba. The meeting in question had been organized by than Ana Montes, who
had specially arranged the meeting dates.187 In this respect, then, Montes had arranged for
Carroll to meet with the Cuban representatives in just enough time to receive a warning
and pass it along to representatives from the State Department, but without enough time
for those representatives to actually prevent the flights from happening.
A counterargument to this example is that Montes could have been unaware of the
planned attack by the Cuban Air Force, or that the Cuban government could have ordered
the strike without the intent of using the tour group to tie the Clinton Administration’s
hands. While these arguments do have some logic, the weight of evidence points to the
fact that Cuba had likely chosen the timeline to ensure that there would be insufficient
warning. The delegation was informed that standing orders existed to shoot down any
further BTTR flights violating Cuban Air Space.188 Yet Cuban Intelligence had
successfully penetrated the BTTR organization, and as such knew of that organization’s
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planned flight schedule.189 With that information, paired with the standing order to shoot
down any BTTR planes, Cuba would have likely known the time they were giving those
representatives was insufficient to prevent the planned flight.
Given the thaw in relations between the United States and Cuba is relatively
recent, and given the fact that Cuba’s government has been slow to relax its security
restrictions, it will likely be some time until additional information about this incident
will be revealed, this case study shows another potential way that individuals operating
inside the US government could influence events, consciously or otherwise.

Vulnerable C4I Infrastructure
As previously mentioned, there are three key categories of facilities critical for the
intelligence enterprise are vulnerable to enemy attack during on control. First, collection
infrastructure are all the facilities needed to properly collect intelligence for decision
makers. This includes the platforms collecting intelligence themselves, such as
reconnaissance aircraft or listening stations. Second, analysis centers are those facilities
needed for intelligence analysts to accurately analyze both collected information on
enemy forces as well as determine the status of the nation's military and civilian
populations. Third, command facilities are the locations essential for national decision
makers to receive intelligence assessments, process them, and use that intelligence to
determine necessary courses of action.
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Communications infrastructure. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
United States Government invested significant resources in efforts to improve the DoD's
communications infrastructure, recognizing that such communications provided
invaluable command and control of US forces. Government officials also recognized the
importance of facilitating necessary communications between decision makers and their
advisors. Working to adapt US command and control infrastructure in an “evolutionary”
manner, the DoD and the DCA opted to eliminate redundant communications
infrastructure and expand the systems that showed the most promise.190 Such steps
included expanding airborne command and control platforms, as well as developing
improved links to US embassies and diplomatic outposts in South America and Europe,
so as to provide the President the ability to consult with US officials located there191.
As part of this effort, the DoD began to place a greater emphasis on the
automation of communications. In 1964, Rand Corporation’s Paul Baran began to write
about the need for a communication network that ensures communications resiliency
through the use of “hot potato routing” through a distributed communications
network,192.he writes, “[e]tremely survivable networks can be built using a moderately
low redundancy of connectivity level. Redundancy levels on the order of only three
permit withstanding extremely heaving level attacks with negligible additional loss to
communications….[T]he redundancy level required to survive even very heavy attacks is
not great -- on the order of only three or four times that of [baseline].”193 This logical
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framework, combined with advances in computer processing power, provided the basis
both for the modern internet as well as more advanced command and control systems. In
1969, ARPANet, employing “network redundancy” to compensate for potential
outages194. Digital communications technology would allow for the development of
modern communications networks.
The current incarnation of the DCA is the Defense Information Systems Agency,
or (DISA), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. DISA maintains and improves the current
nuclear command and control system, the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN). According to DISA, “MEECN is a highly
survivable communications capability which transmits Nuclear Command and Control
(NC2) messages and establishes crisis conferences with the President, Vice President,
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of
the [Combatant Commands] and to deployed nuclear forces.” MEECN is composed of
“C3 assets that provide connectivity from the President to the Secretary of Defense
through the National Military Command System.”195 MEECN is primarily intended to
allow the President to exercise command and control of nuclear forces. It is designed to
support the transmission of orders by the President in a robust enough fashion to survive
a nuclear attack. While MEECN mitigates many of the problems associated with
transmitting nuclear orders to the force that existed in 1962, it is not intended to support
intelligence collection and the collaboration of US intelligence agencies, nor can it
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provide robust communications between the President and advisors at sites which lack
MEECN-connections. For example, MEECN does not connect the President to all
members of the cabinet.
Additionally, much of the nuclear command and control infrastructure is
becoming increasingly dated. The Strategic Automated Command and Control System,
which “"coordinates the operational functions of the United States' nuclear forces, such as
intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear bombers, and tanker support aircraft" currently
runs on a mainframe computer which dates back to the 1970s.196 Pentagon spokeswoman
Lieutenant Colonel Valerie Henderson, commenting on the current state of the nuclear
command and control infrastructure to NPR, observed that Modernization across the
entire Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) enterprise remains
ongoing."197 This is because much of that infrastructure is extremely outdated.
An example of this modernization is the development of new nuclear command
and control facilities to better manage NC3 systems. The US Air Force has begun
standing up new facilities which are intended to better “provide the technical support to
help keep the systems running, maintained and modernized.”198 Additionally, the DoD is
also seeking to field newer, more advanced communication systems that provide more
resilient communications. An example of this is the advanced extremely high frequency
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(AEHF) communications system, which is intended to maintain communication with
deployed nuclear forces199. These systems are intended to be deployed within the next
decade.200
Even so, however, this C4I infrastructure remains vulnerable to attack. Orbiting
collection satellites and their downlink stations, in particular, are susceptible to attack by
a growing number of state actors, to include Russia and China. Development of orbital
weapons by both the United States and Russia (then the Soviet Union) began in the 1970s
and has continued today. These weapons would allow either of these two potential
adversaries the ability to destroy US intelligence collection satellites as well as US
communication satellites201. Such weapons could also target commercial satellites.
Approximately 80 to 90 percent of US military communications, to include the
communication of critical intelligence information, occurs across civilian satellites. An
adversary would not necessarily have to destroy one of these satellites. The option also
exists to jam them to prevent their reliably transmitting their traffic.202
The growth of precision munitions has made targeting vulnerable facilities such
as satellite downlink stations, control nodes, and data processing facilities vulnerable to
attack. China and Russia both have dramatically expanded their land-attack cruise
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missile (LACM) capabilities, which could allow the targeting of such facilities. China,
for instance, has expanded its LACM arsenal to include land-, sea- (both surface and
subsurface), and air-launched missiles. Russia too has done so, going so far as to mount
these missiles in shipping containers to make detecting their launcher far more
difficult203.
Cyber warfare such as hacking and denial-of-service attacks have emerged as
another means to disrupt vital collection communications. Over the summer of 2015, the
communications networks of the JCS were compromised by Russian hackers. This
compromise resulted in their communications being disabled for approximately two
weeks204. Similar hacking attacks against both the Department of State and White House
email networks have also taken place. China too has continued to launch hacking attacks
against US government systems. One such cyber-attack targeted approximately 60
separate networks simultaneously. Such attacks allow the attacker to obscure their
identity, further complicating efforts to combat those attacks.
A counterargument to this is that steps are being taken to protect against cyberintrusions and cyber-attacks. In recognition of this threat, the Pentagon in 2016 proposed
increasing cyber defense spending to approximately $900 million USD205. A emphasis
has been placed on the surety of the nuclear command and control system. Since the US
Air Force has announced that newer missile systems will demonstrate “some level of
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connectivity to the rest of the warfighting system,”206 a great deal of acquisitions and
research is focused on procuring defenses to limit the effectiveness of cyber-attacks. The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been developing
“blockchains,” currently used to secure virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Equinox, and
DogeCoin. This technology essentially acts as an “immutable ledger” that reports if any
given information traveling on the network has been accessed and/or modified207.
That said, however, blockchains only allow the DoD to determine if somebody
has accessed or modified data. It doesn’t prevent that person from doing so in the first
place. In effect, a blockchain acts like a closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system
in a bank. By using that system, security could determine if somebody has broken into
the bank and document what, if anything, that person stole. It does not, however, prevent
that burglar from breaking into the bank in the first place. If an adversary disables an
essential computer network during a crisis, attribution is only part of the problem.
Though decision makers will know who is responsible, they’ll also still need to make use
of that communications network which is now unavailable.
Why is this so? To return to the bank example, while it’s useful that the bank can
identify that a burglar forced his or her way into the bank, if the bank was relying on the
money said burglar stole to operate that next business day then there are additional issues
with which the CCTV did not help. It is for this reason, then, that nuclear strategist Paul
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Bracken remarks that “[t]he intersection of cyberwar and nuclear deterrence has
enormous and widely overlooked implications for stability.”208
Each of these methods could significantly disrupt communications linkages
required for the passing of collected information for exploitation by intelligence analysts.
Such a disruption would complicate the ability of the intelligence community and the US
military to pass critical information to US decision makers, having a potentially
destabilizing impact on escalation control. Worse, these methods of attack are likely as
part of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) efforts to defeat US forces in conventional
combat. In short, the very weapons an adversary can use to prevail in a conventional
conflict could very much degrade the ability of the US to control a nuclear escalation
scenario.
Analysis centers. Today, the intelligence community remains mostly
concentrated around Washington, D.C. Those facilities are as follows.

●
●
●
●
●

The Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia
The National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland
The Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, D.C.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Director of National Intelligence, McClean, Virginia

Both the CIA and NSA remain in their previous locations. The DIA has moved to
Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling just inside the District of Columbia. At this site, DIA is
now closer to the Pentagon and the center of the District of Columbia than it was at
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Arlington Hall, Virginia. In the interim, two additional agencies essential to escalation
control have since built headquarters near Washington. The first is the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), responsible for the analysis of overhead
photography for the intelligence community, to include satellite photography. The
second is the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who serves as the President’s
primary intelligence advisor and oversees the work of the intelligence community.
In short, as more members of the intelligence community have merged since
1962, either as new organizations or the consolidation of pre-existing ones, they have
remained clustered around the capital. The government has effectively abandoned
dispersal as a method of protecting high-value targets209.
From a practical standpoint, abandoning such efforts made sound financial sense.
With the number of Soviet missiles growing, and with their accuracy improving to the
point where the number of warheads required to destroy a target dropped, it was realized
that few such facilities would survive attack. Further, starting in 1963, the individual
intelligence agencies started building more clearly-defined liaison relationships with both
the hardened and mobile command facilities needed to advise the President or the
President's designated successor.
The lack of survivable facilities for the analysis agencies, combined with their
proximity to Washington, D.C. still means that the vast analytic enterprise required to
support a President as they attempt to decide the best course of action to take in an
escalation control scenario remains. The continuing vulnerability of these facilities was
demonstrated during the September 11th attacks in 2001.
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During the September 11th (9/11) attacks, the United States intelligence
community found itself operating out of extremely vulnerable facilities. The
consequences of such a vulnerability dramatically impacted the ability of the intelligence
community to respond to the crisis. The attack struck the north and south World Trade
Center Towers at 8:46 am and 9:03 am EST respectively. The Pentagon was hit by a
third aircraft at approximately 09:45 am EST210. Due to ongoing confusion about the
number of planes and targets involved, there were serious concerns that a follow-on
attack was likely.
At CIA headquarters, the agency's senior leadership opted to meet to discuss
ongoing events at 9:50 am EST. Of particular concern was information provided by
Ramzi Yousef, which indicated that the CIA Headquarters as a potential target during the
planning of the first World Trade Center Bombings in 1993. Within a few minutes of the
attack starting, the decision was made to evacuate CIA headquarters.211 After making this
decision, only a small cadre of senior managers inside the CIA remained behind to
perform intelligence analysis and advise President George W. Bush, which they did at
3:30 pm. Though such a communication took place, most of the Agency's personnel
were unavailable due to the evacuation.
A similar situation occurred at the DIA. The attack on the Pentagon resulted in the
deaths of several DIA employees. As part of the response to this attack, and due to
similar concerns as those of the CIA, the majority of DIA employees evacuated from
DIA headquarters. Though some senior staff remained behind, the majority of analysts
210 9/11 Report p. 1.
211 Brennan, John O. "Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Central Intelligence Agency
Director John O. Brennan at the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York City." Speech, 9/11
Memorial Museum, New York, September 26, 2016.
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and support staff at DIA were unable to work until intelligence agencies determined that
no further attacks were imminent.212
This same vulnerability was also evidenced further in the future. Over Christmas,
2003, US intelligence officials believed that an increase of terrorist communications
meant that an attack on the US, possibly with nuclear weapons, was imminent.
Accordingly, US government officials began to prepare for the possibility that a nuclear
attack on Washington could damage or destroy key government facilities213. At the NSA,
such a fear led then-Director Michael Hayden to contact his counterpart, Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Director David Pepper, to discuss his concerns.
After the conversation, Hayden observed that while NSA satellite locations could pick up
much of the slack should Fort Meade be damaged or destroyed, much of the important
analysis and management would be lost. As such, in the event of such an attack, Hayden
told Pepper that he would transfer control of the NSA’s collection apparatus to GCHQ
until such a time as the Agency could reconstitute elsewhere214.
Each of these examples demonstrates how vulnerable the large, above-ground
infrastructure are to even conventional attack. A nuclear attack could have equally
dramatic consequences, disabling these facilities during a nuclear escalation scenario and
depriving national decision makers of critical intelligence.

212 "This Day in History: Sept. 11, 2001." Defense Intelligence Agency. 2015. Accessed
November 15, 2016. http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article/616903/this-day-in-history-sept11-2001/.
213 Harris, Shane. The Daily Beast. Accessed November 16, 2016.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/09/10/the-time-u-s-spies-thought-al-qaeda-wasready-to-nuke-d-c.html.
214 Ibid.
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Command Facilities. Many national command and facilities remain vulnerable
today as they did during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Fearing that Soviet attacks would threaten the survival of the President, the
government built 75 Presidential Emergency Facilities (PAFs) through the 1970s.
Intended to provide the President or a designated successor a safe location to shelter
during Crisis, the government funded construction of these facilities out of money
allocated for the effort hidden within the US Army's budget and directed construction of
these facilities through the White House Military Office (WHMO). These facilities
consisted of a small shelter to house the President and the President’s entourage, and a
communications suite designed to allow the President to communicate with the outside
world.215 These facilities were augmented by the mobile command centers that had begun
to enter operation in 1962. The President or a designated successor could travel in either
the National Airborne Command post (NEACP), or travel via ground in a convoy of
trucks known as the Ground Mobile Command Facility (GMCF).
Despite all this, the day-to-day command facilities that afford decision makers the
greatest capacity for command and control remain at fixed sites and also remain
vulnerable. And the attacks on 9/11 also provide a case study involving the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) that demonstrates this fact. At 9:37 EST, American
Flight 77216 crashed into the Pentagon’s western side. The aircraft traveled through the
first floor of the building and penetrated the building’s E- and D-Rings (the outermost
and second outermost rings), with the remains of the aircraft stopping just short of C-

215 Krugler, p.184.
216 PBS. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/program/911-inside-pentagon/.
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Ring217. The impact of Flight 77 immediately started fires throughout the Pentagon
complex. Though the NMCC was located under the other side of the Pentagon, the
building’s interconnected support systems such as air processing, temperature control,
and power were connected to the same system. As the fires continued to burn in the
western side, these systems began to fail within the NMCC. Had there not been
significant intervention from the Pentagon’s support staff, the NMCC would have been
forced offline218.
Continuity of Government. Continuity of government also remains a challenge
for the US Government. In the wake of 9/11, a renewed emphasis was placed on
continuity-of-government exercises to prepare for potential attacks on the national
capital. In the weeks following the attacks, essential personnel remained at offsite
locations such as Site R for several weeks until the determination was made that no
further attacks were likely.219 In the ensuing decade, the Federal Government ran many
continuity-of-government exercises. These exercises, however, demonstrated that there
were still serious flaws in government readiness. One study by the Government
Accountability Office audited continuity-of-government exercises by different federal
agencies. They found deficiencies in these preparations, including an inability to validate
that continuity-of-government sites would even have the necessary infrastructure, such as
power, to function. It also found that much of the preparation for continuity-ofgovernment remained on paper and was not fully exercised with the rigor needed in a

217 Condon-Rall, Mary Ellen. Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11. Fort
Detrick, Maryland: Borden Institute, 2011. p 4.
218 PBS. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/program/911-inside-pentagon/.
219 Krugler, p. 185.
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nuclear environment220. Another Government Accountability Office study determined
that the Defense Department remained unready to provide support to continuity-ofgovernment and civil response activities that would be essential to continue government
operations221.

Summary
In discussions of escalation control, an enormous amount of attention is paid to
the survivability of nuclear forces, of civil targets, and of key strategic resources. Part of
this is likely a legacy of the earliest nuclear weapons. In a world of massive retaliation,
the need for nuanced assessments realistically extended no further than assessing what
targets required re-attack. As nuclear strategy has evolved, so too has the need to provide
timely, accurate, unbiased, and persistent intelligence updates.
In the modern era, decision makers have inherited an information management
enterprise that retains many of the shortcomings of previous generations. Bias still enters
the system. Denial and deception remain an issue. Information volume has grown
exponentially every year since 1962, without a corresponding growth in tools to manage
that growth. Worse, the more capable near-peer nuclear forces become, the few
techniques available to protect the assets required to make such assessments have further
declined in utility.

220 Rep. No. GAO-08-185 (2007).
"Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise."
221 Rep. No. GAO-13-763 (2013).
"Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD's Planning for a Complex Catastrophe."
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In short, the dynamics from the Cuban Missile Crisis remain in place. The
practical limits remain, thus potentially depriving decision makers with the information
they need. And without that, escalation control becomes much harder to manage.
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5. CONCLUSION

Nuclear escalation control, as a concept, attempts to avert a total and uncontrolled
nuclear exchange. To do so, it relies on a decision maker choosing limited targeting
options based on the situation that could compel an adversary to accept conflict
termination terms that are favorable to that decision maker’s national interests.
Such decision making, however, requires accurate information, in order to
determine how much damage an adversary has taken, as well as to determine the damage
his or her own forces. Yet the fog of war is as much a part of nuclear escalation control as
it is conventional conflict. The information that a decision maker receives will often be
incomplete, can be inaccurate, and can degrade as the conflict continues.
As we have seen, information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis was
extremely challenging and deeply flawed, due to three principle shortcomings: collection
failures, analytic bias, and vulnerabilities to the command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C4I) infrastructure. These challenges all would have contributed to the “fog”
President Kennedy would have been forced to peer through to determine which best
course of action to take to terminate the conflict on favorable terms.
Failures in collection, driven by the sheer volume of information, robust denial
and deception efforts by an adversary, or technical error on the part of any number of
collection platforms can all result in incomplete or inaccurate information being
processed by the intelligence community. An intelligence community cannot exploit
information that it cannot see, and poor information provided to the intelligence
community will in turn result in poor intelligence.
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The intelligence community, then, would have processed that information.
However, this analytical process was itself vulnerable to analytic bias. Poor analytic
tradecraft and bureaucratic interference both distorted the information being provided to
President Kennedy. Even if collection efforts had been perfect, this analytic bias would
have likely resulted in distorted information being presented to Kennedy, as it was at
numerous points before and during the crisis.
Finally, the command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure
necessary for this collection, analysis, and transmission to Kennedy, as well as the
infrastructure needed to transmit Kennedy’s instructions once he decided to act, were
extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. The communications infrastructure, the analytic
facilities, and the command facilities were both finite in number and vulnerable to even a
few nuclear weapons.
But even over the intervening decades, these issues persist. In examining
numerous contemporary (or near contemporary) case studies, we can see how the same
issues bedevil information management today. In particular, the vulnerability of
continuity-of-government in the face of nuclear attack, persists. The institutional and
bureaucratic pressures that prevented proper dispersal have not disappeared; indeed, the
number of intelligence agencies headquartered in Washington D.C. has only grown.
Ironically, this construction may result in dispersal simply because there are no more
facilities left available in or around the District of Columbia.
An example of this would be the US Army's Cyber Operations Center, in
Augusta, Georgia. However, given the number of nuclear delivery systems and warheads
available to a near-peer adversary, this dispersal concept is likely obsolete. These
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agencies could create more hardened facilities, but cost precludes building these facilities
in a quantity or quality that is likely to serve the number and accuracy of modern nuclear
delivery systems. Further, the growth in near-peer conventional precision strike systems
means those adversaries could accomplish the same thing without crossing the nuclear
threshold and may do so under the guise of conventional warfighting.
We must remain cognizant of these problems today for this very reason.
Forecasting the future is a fraught process. As we have seen, such a process is inherently
vulnerable to any number of analytic failures and biases. That said, perfect collection
systems, a bias-free analytic process, and totally invulnerable C4I facilities all seem
outside the realm of possibility.
Escalation control, at its core, is built around human decision making, yet the fog
of war, omnipresent throughout history, will not suddenly disappear. But without
accurate information to use while making that decision, national leaders cannot expect to
make the best decision possible. And when it comes to nuclear escalation, such
suboptimal decisions can have cataclysmic costs.
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